

A N
ENQUIRY
INTO THE
REASONS
OF THE
CONDUCT OF GREAT BRITAIN,
With Relation to the
Present STATE of AFFAIRS
I N
EUROPE.



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
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CONDUCT of *Great-Britain, &c.*

THE whole Face of Affairs in *Europe* is, within the Space of the last Year, so much altered; that it is almost impossible for the most unconcerned Spectator to prevent his Thoughts from running out into Questions and Suppositions about it. Curiosity itself, the lowest Principle of all our Enquiries, will force its Way into such a Scene: And will expect, or invent, some Account of so surprizing a *Change*; from a Calm hardly paralleled by any past *Prospect*, to a sudden Gathering of Clouds; which, if not soon dissipated, must burst, and discharge themselves some where or other.

But when Self-Interest is joined to this natural Curiosity, and it becomes a *personal* and *National* Concern

Concern, to know the main Causes and Springs of such Events, as All are interested in; there seems then to be a Right, strictly so called, to demand and receive all the Satisfaction the Nature of such Affairs can permit to be given. In a free Nation especially, where no Resolutions can be effectual without the Consent and Support of the Community, every Man, who can think at all, will think it an injurious Treatment; if, at a proper Time, and in a proper Manner, some Light be not held forth to him; and some satisfactory Solution given of such Appearances, as must otherwise very much perplex and disturb him. And one Thing *Governors* themselves are sure to find, That unless they shew such a Regard to Those who justly think they have a Claim to it, this Evil will come to pass, that Mankind (always disposed enough towards Dissatisfaction, either through a sort of a natural Ill-will to Those above them, or through a Weariness under the Continuance of the same *Administration*, or through an affected *Popularity*, or real *Patriotism* not sufficiently instructed) will take that Side of the Prospect to dwell upon, which will afford them most Matter for Satyr at Home; and lay all the Load upon the Conduct of Those, in whose Time of Power such a *Crisis* of Political Affairs appears in the World.

All this was never more true, than in this Nation, and at this Time. Every *Briton*, who either by his Treasure or his Blood, by his Vote or his Interest, by his Person or his Representative, has in Time past born any Part in procuring the Common Peace, and establishing the several Interests, of *Europe*: Every such Member of the *British* Nation, who, by this Time flattered himself with Hopes of enjoying the Result of all our Toil, and
Taxes,

Taxes, and Blood, in an Universal Peace, and an extended undisturbed Commerce, has a Right to ask, ----- How comes this Face of Things to be again over-clouded? ----- All *Europe* once more in Agitation ----- Three Fleets from *Britain* fitted out at a great Expence, and with the utmost Expedition sent to several Parts of the World: ----- And, what is most unaccountable, the *Emperor* and *Spain*, Powers that could hardly be kept within the Bounds of Common Decency, towards one another, by all the Address of two powerful Mediators in a *publick* Treaty, abandoning that *Mediation*; and, in the Middle of it, privately running into one another's Arms, and uniting in Designs destructive to the *Commerce* and *Rights* of other Nations, with all the Marks of Cordial Affection and a Resolute Friendship.

Is not This, the *King* of *Spain* ----- of that Country, which has always felt the Want of the Friendship of *Britain*, more than of That of all other Nations besides; to such a Degree, that it has passed into a *Proverb* throughout the Kingdom, *Paz con Inglaterra, con todos otros la Guerra: Peace with England, and War with all the World besides?* ----- of that Country, which reaps more Advantage from the Trade with *England*, than from That of all its other Neighbours put together? ----- And, Is not this the same King, whose Engagements to the *Interests* and *Possessions* of *Britain* in his Country, are as solemn and strong, as the most express Treaties can make them? ----- The same, who just before the Opening the Congress at *Cambray*, owned and ratified them all, by acceding in Form to the *Quadruple Alliance*; and accepting, by That, the Mediation of *Britain* and *France*?

And

And above all, if we turn our Eyes to the *Emperor*; Is not This the *Prince*, whom we once bore upon *our* Shoulders, out of the Reach of all his Enemies, and supported by *our* Strength in the Time of his own greatest Weakness? ——— The *Prince*, whom *our* Zeal, and *our* Fleets, and *our* Treasure, laboured to fix upon the Throne of *Spain*, at a Time when Difficulties and Dangers surrounded the whole Imperial House at *Vienna*? ——— And now, Vested, as we always wished Him to be, with the High and August Dignity He enjoys? Is not this the *Emperor*, who may justly be said to owe the Preservation even of all his Hereditary Countries, and of his Imperial Crown itself, (if we may have Liberty to say so,) to that hazardous and unequalled March of the Confederate Army into *Germany*, and to the happy Consequences of it? To that *Victory*, in which the *British*, *Dutch*, *Hanoverian*, *Prussian*, and *Hessian* Troops bore so great a Part; and, in a particular Manner, to that *British* General, who projected and conducted the *Whole*? ——— And the same *Emperor*, who, as He was throughout the last War the chief Object of the Love and good Wishes of this Nation, so, at the End of it, was established in the Possession of *Flanders*; and owes *Ostend* itself to those victorious Arms, which had before supported his Person, and preserved the *Empire* for him? And all this long Scene of Service and Toil, entered into and prosecuted by us, We must own, against the repeated Remonstrances of *many*, that We were hastning apace to make Him a Power too great and too formidable, and that we should find in *Him* at last, the Enemy we then dreaded only in *another*?

It is natural to every *Briton* to look back, and to ask these and the like Questions. And the next Thought which succeeds, is almost as natural ; That it is hardly to be supposed, that these Powers should take such Steps without something to justify them. We can hardly imagine it possible, That, without some real and high Provocation, the *Emperor* could throw any the least Indignity upon the *Crown of Great Britain* ; or act any injurious or even hard Part towards a Nation which had sacrificed so much Treasure and so much Blood to his Service. And therefore, we are apt enough to conclude, (and have Reason to do so, till we find it otherwise) That some great Mismanagement on the Part of *Britain* ; some unjustifiable Partiality towards Others ; some Breach of Faith ; some Outrage or other in Politicks, has been committed against his *Imperial Majesty* : Or, that some unpardonable Behaviour on our Part, with Regard to his just Interests, must have been the Occasion of a Conduct that so far exceeds the Common Maxims of *Princes* and *States* towards one another.

And indeed, I shall be very free to own, If this be the Case ; if either solemn *Treaties*, or any Engagements, with the *Court of Vienna*, have been broke through ; if either Affronts, or even Neglects inconsistent with the Duty of a faithful Ally, have been Part of the Conduct of the *present Court of Great-Britain* towards his *Imperial Majesty* ; former Appearances ought not to be spoken of ; all past Obligations ought to be as nothing in the present Account ; the *Emperor* has a Right to guard and strengthen himself by *Treaties contrary* to his former *Treaties*, and to act the Part He judges best for his own Honour and Security : And we of this Nation have no Right to tax *Him*, either with In-
grati-

gratitude unprovoked, or with Breach of Faith without the Appearance of a Justification; but ought to turn all our Zeal against Those, whose Counsels, and whose Behaviour, upon this Supposition, have made such a Conduct on his Part, wise, just, and necessary. And the same must be acknowledged with Regard to *Spain* also; if any such *Excuse* can justly be alledged, on that Side.

We will now, therefore, enquire What has been the Behaviour of the *King* and *Nation* of *Great-Britain*, since his present *Majesty* came to the Throne, towards the *Emperor* particularly; and, as we pass, towards *Spain* also. And I will put the Account of this into *two Periods*. The *first* shall be, from his Majesty's Accession to the Crown, to the Opening the *Congress* at *Cambray*: The *Second*, from the Opening of that *Congress* to the Signing of the *Treaty* of *Peace* at *Vienna* between the *Emperor* and *Spain*.

At the Time when his *Majesty* came to the Throne of *Great-Britain*, several Points of great Importance remained to be adjusted, before the *Peace* of *Europe* could be esteem'd as a Thing fix'd upon any lasting and solid Foundation; in particular, some Things very uneasy to the *Emperor*, and others very much desired by *Spain*. In consideration of this, his Majesty, after other previous Treaties and Conventions, enter'd directly upon these necessary Points, which were fix'd in the *Treaty* of *London*, *July* 22. 1718. entirely to the *Emperor's* Satisfaction: Who was himself a *Party* in that Treaty, and confirmed with his own Hand what his *Ministers* had before signed in his Name. His *Italian* Dominions, always dear to him, He justly thought not very secure, without the Possession of *Sicily*; upon which the Preservation of *Naples* very much depends.

depends. This great and important Point, the *King of Great-Britain* fix'd, as a main Article of this *Treaty*: And engaged, in Concert with *France*, that, *Sardinia* being delivered up to the *Emperor* by *Spain*, the *King of Sicily* should accept of that Island in lieu of *Sicily*, which he should yield to the *Emperor*.

On the Part of *Spain*, a Favourite Point was likewise settled. *Don Carlos*, Son to the present *Queen*, was establish'd in the Succession of *Tuscany*, *Parma*, and *Placentia*: And This consented to, by the *Emperor*, who alone was capable of disturbing it; and effectually guaranteed by the *Powers of Britain and France*. I will at present name no other Particulars, but these *two* principal ones. Some other Points, Circumstances, and Incidents, in order to perfect the Peace between the *Emperor* and *Spain*, remain'd to be settled in a Congress, under the Mediation of *Britain and France*: And this *Mediation* made a Part and an express Article of this *Treaty of London*, to which the *Emperor* long ago, and *Spain* afterwards, set their Hands, and gave their solemn Consent. The former of the two Articles now mentioned, *viz.* That relating to *Sicily*, did not long subsist in Words only; but was soon actually put in Execution; and the *Emperor* put in Possession of that Kingdom.

Hitherto, nothing but *Friendship* appears; and perhaps, *Friendship* to Excess. What the *Emperor* exceedingly desired, is granted to Him; and nothing granted to *Others*, but what the *Emperor* himself had previously consented to, as a reasonable and fitting *Equivalent*: Neither had the *King of Spain* any Reason to complain, when the Succession of *Don Carlos* in *Italy* was put in so sure a Way of taking place at the Time appointed. So far indeed, was *He* from it, That, before the O-

pening of the *Congress*, He himself acceded to the *Treaty of London*, and consented to all the Allotments made in it.

The *Congress* was at length open'd at *Cambray*, Jan. 26. N. S. 1723-4. in order to settle all remaining Uncertainties, under the Care of the two mediating Powers, *Britain* and *France*. This will be a *Second Period*; from this Opening at *Cambray*, to the Opening of another Scene at *Vienna*. And through the whole Management of this *Congress*, the Part the *Mediators* acted, was so impartial, so equitable, so agreeable to the *Treaty of London*, which was the Basis of this *Congress*; that the most solemn Appeal may be made to Both the *contesting Powers*, whether any one Step was taken, which could give any the least just Ground of Complaint. No appeal is, indeed, necessary. The *Imperial Court* would loudly have complained of any Conduct; if there had been any towards that Court which could have deserv'd it. But there never was any Complaint of that Sort from thence: Nor indeed could there have been any made, without discovering at the same Time that there was nothing to complain of, but the too great Equity and Justice observ'd by the *Mediators* between the two contending Powers, and their resolute Adherence to all *Treaties*; and particularly to that of *London*, to which this Court itself had consented. Nor did *Spain* make the least Complaint against the Behaviour of the *mediating Powers*, through the whole Progress of the Mediation; but what arose from the constant Justice of the *Mediators*, in keeping within the Bounds of their Duty and Honour, and their not giving into any new and exorbitant Demands of that Court.

Thus,

Thus, therefore, stands the Case. Whilst a *Mediation* was happily going on, under the Sanction of a solemn Treaty, appointing this *Mediation*; and this *Appointment* sign'd, and consented to, by these contending Crowns, without any apparent Dissatisfaction, or even the least Pretence for it; a *private Treaty* is enter'd into, carried on, and finish'd at *Vienna*; in plain Contradiction to that *Article* relating to the *Mediation*, by which they had solemnly oblig'd themselves to settle the Points in Difference, under the Eye and Influence of *Great Britain* and *France*: And the whole conducted with the highest Disrespect to the mediating Powers, and without the least seeming Desire of keeping the common Measures of Decency with them. Considering, therefore, only the Manner and Circumstances attending this Transaction between the *Emperor* and *Spain* at *Vienna*; as it was a Violation of an *express Article* of a former Treaty sign'd by Themselves, and an high and unprovoked Indignity offer'd to the *Mediators*; these were alone enough to justify the *Mediators*, in any publick Act of due Resentment of such Usage.

But so far were they from shewing any such Resentment; so far from making this open Affront, the Occasion of an open Rupture; that, when the *Signing of this Treaty* was first, in Form, notified to the two Courts of *Britain* and *France*; and it was declared to be no other than a *Defensive* one, with Regard only to the mutual Satisfaction of the *Emperor* and *Spain*; and not contradictory, but perfectly agreeable to the Treaty of *London*: So far were They from improving such Usage into a publick Quarrel, that, both at Home, and by their Ministers every where Abroad, They express'd a great Pleasure that the *Two Powers*, whom the *Mediators* at *Cambray* could not bring even to Terms of com-

mon Civility towards one another, had found the happy Means, without the Ceremony and Assistance of any *Mediator*, to get over Difficulties that had been declared almost insuperable; and to link themselves in the Bands of Friendship, upon Terms, not inconsistent (as it was affirm'd) with the *Repose of Europe*. This was the great End of the Congress itself: And, if this End were answered, the mediating Powers were not solicitous about the Means used in compassing it; but could pass over the great Disregard shown towards Themselves, in Consideration of the solid and common Good obtain'd by this Agreement.

But in how decent a Manner soever, the Courts of *Britain* and *France* treated this Affair? Those of the *Emperor* and *Spain* saw very well that such a Step could not but be very shocking to the *Mediators*; and stood in need of the best Apology they could make. And very luckily (as they or their *Agents* thought) for Themselves: The Behaviour of the *Court of France*, in sending back the *Infanta* to *Spain*, joined with his *Britannick Majesty's* not accepting the *sole Mediation* at *Cambray*, furnished them with One as good as they could have wish'd. And therefore, the *Imperial Ministers* at *Cambray*, at *London*, and at *Paris*, were very ready at first to put it all upon this; and to declare that, the Reason of this extraordinary Step was, that the *Court of France* having affronted his *Catholick Majesty* in so high and so unpardonable a Manner, that *Spain* could not in Honour any longer act with the *Most Christian King* as a *Mediator*; and the *King of Great Britain* having declined to act as *sole Mediator*, when it was propos'd to him to do so by the *Crown of Spain*: This broke off all Hopes of any Effect from the Congress at *Cambray*, and left his *Catholick Majesty* nothing

thing to do, but to fly to *Vienna*; and, out of a due Resentment of so great an Injury, and the Necessity of his Affairs, to throw himself intirely upon the Honour and Equity of that Court: And, more particularly, that his *Imperial Majesty*, upon *Ripperda's* first Applications, shewed a great Unwillingness to move the *Negotiations* out of their Course at *Cambray*; but at last, prevailed upon himself, out of Love to the *Publick Tranquillity*, to consent to the carrying them on at *Vienna*, after he found it more and more plain, that the Resentment of *Spain* against *France*, and his *Britannick Majesty's* Refusal of the *sole Mediation*, made it impossible to proceed at *Cambray*.

Such was the Language of the *Imperialists*, upon the first Notification of the *Vienna Treaty*, when they thought it needful to make an Apology for it. And tho' it cannot be affirmed, that the *Court of Spain* did itself expressly offer this as the first moving Reason of that Piece of Conduct; yet (according to the best Accounts from *Spain*) upon the first publick News of the *Vienna Treaty* at *Madrid*, the Discourses of many were taught to run that Way, and to dwell upon that same popular Topick. And without Doubt it was thought a very cunning Part, thus to attribute such a Conduct to sudden Rage and Passion; that *this* might afford some Colour for a *Treaty* in Appearance so detrimental to *Spain*, and a little palliate the *low Terms* accepted by that Crown; and by this Means, as they flattered themselves, remove all Suspicion of any pernicious and unjustifiable Secret behind the Curtain, till the due Time came for revealing it.

But as *Facts* and *Dates* are stubborn Things, not to be shaken by the Sound of Words and plausible Speeches; this itself proved the most unlucky Pre-
tence

tence possible: and only opened a Door to the best grounded Suspicions, that something very bad to be owned, was at the Bottom of such a Behaviour.

The Courts of *Great Britain* and *France* were not so idle Spectators of the Affairs of *Europe*, but that they had long before this the most evident Proofs in their Possession, that this Account of that Transaction was impossible to be true. The Resolution of the Court of *France*, relating to the *Infanta*, did not come (no, not in Suspicion) to *Madrid*, till *March 8 N. S. 1724-5*. *Ripperda*, who conducted the new Treaty, had been sent to *Vienna* above three Months before that, and even his full Powers for making this clandestine Treaty were sign'd November 22. 1724. And soon after the Treaty of Peace was sign'd in Form at *Vienna*, the publick Language at the Court of *Madrid*, was, That they had looked upon the Peace with the *Emperor*, as a Thing sure ever since the preceeding *March 29*, on which Day a Courier was known to come from *Vienna* to *Madrid*, with the News of all the principal Articles being adjusted, i. e. twenty one Days only, from the Day of the first News at *Madrid*, of the King of *France's* Resolution of annulling his Marriage with the *Infanta*.

This is so evident a kind of Demonstration, that Persons of the lowest Understanding cannot but conclude from it, how absurd it is, to make this Resolution of the Court of *France*, the first Step towards an Excuse for what was resolved on, and set on foot, with full Powers signed for the Purpose, above three Months before it. For who is there, that cannot immediately see, That a Proceeding authorized November 22. could not be owing to an Affront which was not heard of till *March 8*. following? And that a Treaty thoroughly adjusted, in
its

its main Articles, at *Vienna*, so early in *March*, as to be known at *Madrid* the 29th of that Month, could not be so much as facilitated, or modelled by what was not known at *Madrid* till the 8th of the same *March*; and which therefore could not in so few Days be sent to *Vienna* to operate *there*, and the *News* of that *Operation* be return'd to *Madrid*.

But, if possible, it was still more unaccountable to draw an Excuse from his *Britannick Majesty's* not taking upon himself the *sole Mediation* at *Cambray*; which it was well known he could nothave done, without an open Affront to *France*, and a manifest Violation of the *Quadruple Alliance*; besides other Inconveniencies: For it was not till *March* 9. 1725, that the *Court* of *Spain* moved this. — The *Motion* was then to be transmitted to *London*, and the Answer to it to be sent back to *Madrid*. This Answer did not arrive till about *April* 24. following; and therefore, I need not say, could not have the least Part in a *Treaty* set on Foot above *four Months* before, and sign'd in Form *April* 30. 1725, at *Vienna*, i. e. about a Week after his Majesty's declining the *sole Mediation* was known at *Madrid*; and when it was impossible to. be known at *Vienna*. These, therefore, were Pretences intirely foreign from the true Reasons of that Conduct. The *Treaty* of *Vienna* was authoritatively begun, and going forward, long before the *Provocation* from *France* could possibly palliate that clandestine and dishonourable Proceeding: And it must have been brought to perfect Maturity, before the *Motion* was so much as made to his Majesty to take on him the *sole Mediation*; because it was even sign'd in Form before the Intelligence of the King's Resolution against the *sole Mediation* could, with any Certainty, arrive at *Vienna*. And from such an Apology, at the first Appearance

pearance of the *new Alliance*, the Courts of *Britain* and *France* had a Right to be jealous, and to suspect some Secrets of a very pernicious Nature still behind.

But we have not yet done with this first Scene. It is proper to observe, That, during this whole Proceeding, and for the Space of above three Months after the News of sending back the *Infanta* was come from *France* to *Madrid*, the Expressions of Friendship towards the *British Court* ran as high as possible at the Court of *Spain*, viz. to this Purpose; "That his Catholick Majesty was resolv'd
"to separate himself for ever from *France*, and place
"his entire Friendship and Confidence solely in the
"King of Great Britain: — That to this End he
"now desired to enter into the most strict Engagements
"for the rendering that Friendship perpetual. — That
"it was hoped, his Majesty would suffer the Nego-
"tiations at *Cambray* to go on under his Mediation
"only, INTO WHOSE HANDS HE WAS DESTI-
"ROUS TO PUT ALL HIS INTERESTS, &c." Whilst all this Time *Ripperda* was acting with full Powers at *Vienna*, in Contradiction not only to this Mediation, and the Measures by which it must have been conducted, had his Majesty accepted it; but, as we shall soon see, to all subsisting Engagements, and in Violation of the *Laws* of Friendship and Amity between Nations. Nay, whenever that Negotiation of *Ripperda's*, at *Vienna*, happened to be touch'd upon, as a Piece of common Talk only, the Language of the Court of *Spain* was, "That he
"was an enterprising Man, and loved to make a Noise
"in the World;" insinuating by this, That that Court had no Part in what *Ripperda* was doing at *Vienna*.

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When *his Majesty's* Reasons for not taking upon himself the *sole Mediation* were represented at *Madrid*, the Force of them was acknowledged by that Court; and, at the same Time, a great Willingness was expressed to accept even of a *Reparation* from France, for the Indignity offer'd to Spain, so it might come through the Hands of the King of Great Britain, and the Pleasure that Court would have, upon such a Reparation, "in the Prosecution of the Negotiations at Cambray IN THE MANNER IN WHICH THEY WERE BEGUN; his Majesty being a common Friend to both Parties, and One of whose Affection Spain had so often, and particularly upon this last Occasion, received the most essential Proofs." I hardly need to observe, That at this very Time Things were so ripe at *Vienna*, that the Treaty of Peace was sign'd in Form April 30. about seven or eight Days after this Language of Friendship at the Court of *Madrid*; and after these earnest Desires expressed, of the Continuation of the Negotiations at *Cambray*, in the Manner in which they were begun.

But this Way of speaking did not cease yet: For after May 21. on which Day a Courier arrived at *Madrid*, with the News that the Treaty of Peace between the Emperor and Spain was sign'd on April 30. After this publick Intelligence of a Treaty sign'd at *Vienna*, the Language of the Court of Spain was full of Excuses for not having communicated the Steps of this Negotiation at *Vienna* to his Britannick Majesty; and full of the usual Professions of a particular "Regard for his Friendship, and a sincere Desire of cultivating the strictest Union with him; together with all Assurances, "That nothing had been stipulated in this Treaty, in any wise prejudicial to the King, or to the Interests of his Subjects, or in the least

“ least contrary to any of the Engagements enter’d in-
 “ to with him, either separately or jointly with France;
 “ and Expressions of a deep Sense of the great Obliga-
 “ tion that Court had to his Majesty for the Proofs he
 “ had so often given of his Friendship and Regard
 “ for the Interest of Spain; always accompanied
 “ with the Hope, that what had happened would in
 “ no wise lessen his Majesty’s Friendship, which this
 “ Court entirely depended upon, and desired to culti-
 “ vate by all the Ways possible.”

There were indeed Tokens and Symptoms of Evil continually, during this whole Scene of Civility, shewing themselves, fully sufficient to guard against all Trust in any such Professions, either of the Court of *Madrid*, or that of *Vienna*; and these, succeeded by worse and worse Appearances; and at last, by such certain Proofs as can leave no doubt of a *Secret Treaty* of the most dangerous Consequence between the two new Allies. And I will now mention some, in the Order of their Time.

1. On May 1. O. S. 1725. the *Emperor’s Minister* at *London* notified in Form to the Court of Great Britain, the Signing of a *Treaty of Peace* at *Vienna* between his Master and the King of Spain; and communicated a Copy of that *Treaty* at the same Time. After Assurances that this *Treaty* was made upon the Foot of the *Quadruple Alliance*, with strict Regard to all former Engagements, and the like: He expressed his Imperial Majesty’s Hope, that his *Britannick Majesty* would accede to this *Treaty*; and by virtue of that Accession be Guarantee to the Succession to the Territories of the *Emperor*, as settled in his Family by a late Constitution: And before he concluded, said, “ That, after the Signing of
 “ the *Vienna Treaty*, *Ripperda* acquainted the *Empe-*
 “ *ror*, that there remained still some Things to re-
 “ gulate

“gulate between the *King* his Master, and the *King*
 “of *Great Britain*; and that the *King* of *Spain* re-
 “quested the *Emperor* to make use of his *Mediation*
 “for the settling them; That the *Emperor* had an-
 “swer’d, that if these Affairs had any Relation to
 “the Treaty of *London*, or arose in Consequence of
 “that Treaty; and if it should prove agreeable to
 “his *Britannick Majesty*, he would employ his *Me-*
 “*diation*; but otherwise, he would not concern
 “himself with them.”

To all this it was answer’d, “That, as for the
 “*Signing* of the Treaty at *Vienna*, it was no News
 “here; his Majesty having already by a Courier
 “received Advice of it: That, with Regard to the
 “*Guaranty* mentioned, his Majesty could not con-
 “sent to burthen himself with new Obligations,
 “by being *Guarantee* of the *Succession* lately esta-
 “blished by the *Emperor*; but was resolved to leave
 “his Hands at Liberty, in order to have it in his
 “Power to regard and assist his true Friends upon
 “all Occasions that may arise; and that, as for
 “what he had related as represented by *Ripperda* to
 “his *Imperial Majesty*, this Court knew of nothing
 “*Britain* had to settle with *Spain*, but some Points
 “of *Commerce*, for which there could be no Need of
 “a *Mediator*.”

And certainly, no one can think but that it was
 wisely and happily judg’d, to refuse a *Guaranty*,
 which might have been attended with so fatal Con-
 sequences. For, as the *Emperor’s* Children are now
Females only; and the Influence of that *Succession*
 upon *Europe* must depend upon the *Marriages* of
 these *Females*; and as no one then knew, to what *Prin-*
ces they might be hereafter married: It was wise in
 his Majesty not to oblige himself to support a *Successi-*
on which might possibly, by some future *Marriages*,

become formidable to the rest of *Europe*, and fatal in the End to *Britain* it self. And as it was wise, so it is already proved to be *happy*, that such an Engagement was refused: For (as it will by and by appear) the *Succession* is already in Prospect formidable; the *Archduchesses* are destin'd to the *Infants* of *Spain*, and such a *Power* arising from this Conjunction, as in all human Probability may make the rest of *Europe* tremble.

Nor can the Argument taken from the *Emperor's Guaranty* of the *Succession* here, in his Majesty's Family, (which has been since urged,) be of any Force in this Case. For, in the *first Treaty* between his Majesty and the *Emperor*, this *Prince* absolutely refused to be *Guarantee* to our *Succession*; and never would hear of it, 'till by the *Quadruple Alliance* his Majesty had obtained for Him the great Advantage of the Possession of *Sicily*. As therefore, his Imperial Majesty refus'd the *Guaranty* of the *Succession* here, in his Majesty's Royal Family, in one Treaty, tho' a Treaty entered into and prosecuted with perfect Amity on both Sides; and as He would not afterwards come into it, but upon a very signal and beneficial Acquisition to himself first settled: This cannot be judged a good Argument for his Majesty, to accede to a Treaty enter'd into and finish'd, not only without his Privity; not only without any Regard to his Friendship, or any one Mark of Respect towards him; but in open Disrespect to him, as *Mediator* at a Congress then subsisting; and, under these very different Circumstances, to become a *Guarantee* of a *Succession*, of the Consequences of which, to his own Kingdoms, and the rest of *Europe*, no Judgment could be made, till the *Marriages* of the

two Archdutchesses should come to be settled and known. But, to return to our present Subject,

This *Proposal* of the *King's* being a Guarantee for the *new establish'd* Succession in *Germany*, [to which the *Emperor* could not in Reason expect a Compliance] consider'd alone, gave Ground for a Suspicion, that some latent Matter for Quarrel was now treasuring up. And this Suspicion justly increased, upon the Offer of the *Emperor's* *Mediation*, coming at the same Time with this *Treaty* itself. For this *Offer* supposed *Differences* between *Britain* and *Spain*: And as these must be *Differences* without any real Ground, (every material Thing being settled by *Treaties* between those two Nations,) this look'd like a Design to blow up a Fire where there was none; and to presume an Uneasiness between *Spain* and *Britain*, which might be improved hereafter into an open Rupture.

It is impossible, as we pass, not to observe how very artful the *Manner* of this *first* Proposition must now appear, since Things have opened more to the Eyes of the World. The *Offer*, we see, is made for accommodating *Differences*, without naming, or hinting at, any particular one. There could be no doubt but that the *Offer* was really made with Relation to *Gibraltar*. The *Emperor's* Minister was not to name this: But some time after, the Court of *Madrid* openly avowed, that the *Mediation* of the *Emperor* which *Spain* had accepted, was a *Mediation* for the *Restitution* of *Gibraltar*: Nay, and some time after that, the *Emperor* himself, (as we shall soon see) orders his *Resident* here, to shew the *Words* in which he had obliged himself to this *Mediation* for *Gibraltar*. Again, this *Offer* is made, merely as arising from a Discourse of *Ripperda's*; without the least Hint of any *Obligation*

tion upon the *Emperor* to make it, or to prosecute it. And afterwards, this Offer of *Mediation* appears, by Order of the Imperial Court, as an express *Article* of a *Treaty* between *Him* and *Spain*. But, what is still more, his Imperial Majesty by his *Minister* represents his Answer to *Ripperda* to have been, that he would not concern himself in any *Affair* that did not arise in consequence of the *Treaty* of *London* not even so far as to use his *Mediation*: and afterwards (as it will presently appear) by his *Resident* here, produces the *Article* itself, by which he had engaged himself to use his good Offices, that is, his *Mediation*, for the Restitution of *Gibraltar*; of that Place, the Possession of which was known to be ascertained to the Crown of *Great Britain* by that very *Treaty* of *London*, confirming the *Treaty* of *Utrecht*; and about which therefore, it was as well known, that there could be no just Ground for a Difference.

All this sufficiently confirms, in Event, the Justice of that *Suspicion* of some *Secret Agreements* between the *Emperor* and *Spain*, which the Offer of this *Mediation* immediately raised in the Court of *Great Britain*: And this, before the *Treaty* of *Peace* now delivered could be read and considered. But,

2. When the *Treaty* itself was read and examined; and such *Friendship* was seen to be established between such Powers, upon such Terms; the Consideration of this might justly raise yet stronger *Suspensions*. For thus the Case appeared. Nothing was found in this *Treaty* of *Peace*, of Importance, or, so much as in Appearance, Honourable to *Spain*: Nothing of the Order of the *Golden Fleece*, which had been so much insisted on at the Congress: Nothing of the *Titles* to be used by these *Two Powers*, but what might easily have been settled there, much more to the Honour of *Spain*.

Spain. And, if we come to Points of much more Importance; the *Neutral Garrisons*, which, by the *Quadruple Alliance*, were to be the great Bulwarks of the Succession of *Don Carlos* to *Tuscany*; and every Thing the *Mediators* had propos'd for *his* Security, and that of the Duke of *Parma*, were all lost to *Spain* by this Proceeding: Whilst the *Emperor* gains every Thing, and particularly the *Guaranty* of his own Succession by *Spain*, which the *Imperial Ambassadors* had solicited in vain at the *Congress*.

To see, therefore, *Two Powers*, full of such a Rancour against one another as had resisted the Influence of a powerful Mediation for several Years, now in so short a Space of Time running into one another's Embraces, with so much Eagerness and Precipitation: — To find (upon comparing this new Treaty with former Pretensions,) the *Crown of Spain*, at *Cambray*, so exceedingly uneasy with the good Terms it was sure of obtaining by the *Congress* there; at *Vienna*, so readily submitting to much worse: — At *Cambray*, not to be satisfied with the *Emperor's* Faith, even with the *Guaranty* of *Britain* and *France* together; at *Vienna*, entirely depending upon the Faith of the same *Emperor*, without any *Guaranty* present or to come: — What could be collected from such an Appearance, even upon the first Reading, but that this Treaty of Peace now communicated at *London*; was not the sole Treaty made at *Vienna*; but that there must be a secret one still behind, too unjustifiable to be yet revealed? And of this, more *Suspensions* followed thick upon one another. For,

3 Soon after the Treaty of Peace was signed at *Vienna*, which was April 30. 1725. *Ripperda's* Insolences towards his Majesty, and even Threatnings began; and from that Time continued, till it was thought

thought more *politick* to be more *silent*. Of these, the Advices from *Vienna* were now perpetually full. Such, for Instance, as these that follow, were his common Discourses.

“ If King George supports France, we know very well how to Place the Pretender upon the Throne. — Alberoni was a Great Man, but committed many Blunders: One great one was, That he sent the Spanish Fleet to Sicily, instead of Sending it to England, to dethrone the King, which might easily then have been done; and this once done, the Way had been made plain for every Thing else. — King George had best consider how to come to Terms with us; for we have it in our Power to push the Pretender’s Interests with Efficacy. „ And in all his Discourses of this Sort, he always took it for granted, that the Court of *Vienna* would never make the least Hesitation to enter into all the Measures of Spain.

His Conversations of this peculiar Malignancy towards his *Britannick Majesty*, were without Number, and without Measure. And so far was he from seeming to desire, they might be kept secret, that one of his Speeches to his Company was this; *I know all that I say, is told again. I am very glad of it. I say what I say, on Purpose that it may be told.* Nor did he speak with much greater Respect of his Majesty’s Allies; particularly, upon the Mention of the Treaty of *Hanover*, between the Kings of Great Britain, France, and Prussia, he said aloud, *Tes, yes, We shall teach these little Gentlemen (Petits Messieurs) to make Treaties.* And I will add here, that about this Time, a very considerable Man in the Court of *Vienna*, was not much behind *Ripperda* himself in his Regards towards his Majesty; when, in a Conversation, upon a Person’s expressing his Doubt about his *Britannick Majesty’s* undertaking to be Guarantee of the *Austrian Succession*,

he

he answered with a great deal of Emotion, *Then let him look to himself; for we are well inform'd, they begin to be weary of him in England.*

We may well think these and many more *Insults and Threatnings*, from Persons of such Figure at that Time, sufficient to create new *Suspensions*, as well as to strengthen Those already created. Such Usage, and such Freedom of Language, could not arise out of nothing; but must be the *Effect* of some *Agreements and Resolutions*, not yet appearing to the World.

4. These *Suspensions* were greatly confirm'd by the Accounts from *Vienna* of *Ripperda's* Expressions of another Sort, immediately after the signing the *Treaty of Peace*; Expressions, I mean, dropt sometimes, as it were accidentally, upon several very important Points. He did not scruple, in proper Places, and upon proper Occasions, to declare in Conversation, that *Spain was engaged to support the Ostend Company*; and when that led the Discourse to *Gibraltar*, he said, *We know Gibraltar to be impregnable; but by the Measures we have now taken here, we assure Ourselves we shall oblige England to give it up.* At the same Time, he spake of the *Marriage of Don Carlos with the eldest Archduchess*, as a Thing agreed upon; and added, the *Prince of Asturias*, for whom this Match was first designed, is *consumptive, and can't live.* And surely, such Expressions must amount to the strongest *Suspensions* of a *Treaty*, as yet Secret, of which these Three important Points must make a Part. This is the least we can say of such Discourse, coming from a Principal Agent in this *New Alliance*, though at this Time only in the way of accidental Conversation.

5. These *Suspensions* grew stronger, upon the Appearance of the *Treaty of Commerce*; which, tho' sign-

ed at *Vienna* on the Day after the *Treaty of Peace*, yet was not *communicated* to the Court of *Great Britain* by the Emperor's Order; nor any *Notification*, to this Hour, made, of such a *Treaty*, either *before* or *since* the Signing it. The King's Minister at *Vienna* procured a *Copy* of it, as soon as it was printed there, and transmitted it to *London*. When this came to be read, and when it appeared in the plainest Light, that, by the express Words of it, such *Alterations* were made in the *Commerce of Europe*, as must begin in the Ruin of our *East* and *West-India* Trade, and end in that of all the other *valuable* Branches of our Commerce: What could the Court of *Great Britain* conclude from such a *Treaty*, but that even This, bad as it is, is not all: That there must be something yet unknown to put in the *Balance*, on the Side of *Spain*, for all these unparalleled Advantages given, against the express Words of former *Treaties*, to the Emperor and his Subjects; and that *They*, who were capable of entring into such *Articles* as these which now appear'd, could not hope to succeed in them, without other *Articles*, and another *Treaty*, still kept in Darknes, till the proper Time of producing it should come?

6. About the End of *July*, or the Beginning of *August*, the D — of *Wb* — n arrived at *Vienna*. The Court of *London* was not ignorant of his real Errand; nor of the Sum of Money he received in his Journey, towards his Expences, from the *Pretender's* Friends. And tho' he disguis'd his Design a little, when he first appeared at *Vienna*, and pretended to his Majesty's Friends there, that his View was only to travel for a few Years, till the Memory of his Extravagancies at Home might be a little effac'd, and his private Affairs in better Order: Yet he quickly acted another Part in all his Conversation and Conduct, He soon grew intimate with *Ripperda*, with whom he had frequent

quent Conferences, and from whom he was known to receive Money. He was admitted to the Conversation of the principal Persons of the Court of *Vienna*. And, during his whole Stay, both *He* and *Graham*, the Pretender's Agent at *Vienna*, had a very particular Intimacy with the *Russian Minister* at that Court. At first the Project was, that *He* was to return to *England*, and do great Exploits there; but when he himself began not to think *England* a very safe Place for one who had laid himself so open, the Design of his Return thither was laid aside; and another Plan was then concerted, of sending him to *Rome* to the Pretender, and from thence to *Spain*. And before he parted from *Vienna*, his intimate and Fellow Labourer *Graham*, had long Conferences with a Person of great Importance at that Court, as he had afterwards several others. This Conduct of *Wb* — *n* at *Vienna*, and of so many considerable Persons whilst he was there, still increased the Opinion, that the new Alliance could not be so innocent a Thing as the publick Treaty of Peace.

7. The smooth Language at *Madrid* was by this Time gradually abated, and at length quite changed. At the End of *June* 1725. the Court of *Spain* openly avowed the Acceptance of the *Emperor's* Mediation for the Restitution of *Gibraltar*; but at the same Time made the usual Professions of Friendship for the King of *Great Britain*, and hoped that this Acceptance of that Mediation would not offend him. Nor did this Court make any Scruple frankly now to own that the Affair of *Gibraltar* had been, from the Beginning, a principal Point concerted between the *Emperor* and *Spain*. In Consequence of this, about the Middle of *July* following, *M. Grimaldo*, by Order of his Catholick Majesty, wrote a Letter to his *Britannick Majesty's* Minister at *Madrid*; the Conclusion of which was

very Peremptory, "That the Continuance of the
 "Alliance and Commerce of Great Britain with
 "Spain, depended upon his Majesty's restoring Gi-
 "braltar forthwith." And the Language of this
 Court, from this Time, was of an insulting Strain
 with Regard even to the King himself, who was then
 at *Hanover*; and in Words not very civil, to this
 Effect, "Let him make Haste Home, and call his Par-
 "liament, and propose the Restitution immediately."
 This Alteration in the Language of the Court of *Madrid*;
 this demanding *Gibraltar* in so peremptory a Manner,
 which *Britain* possesses by Treaties sign'd by this King
 of *Spain* himself, gave another just Ground of Suspi-
 cion of a *Secret Offensive Treaty*, of a very pernicious
 Nature.

8. What confirm'd all these Suspicions very much,
 was the Reception of *Ripperda* at *Madrid*; of the Man
 who had been the Maker of the *Vienna Treaties*, and
 who had used his Majesty in so insolent and outra-
 gious a Manner. For, as before his coming thither,
 no Satisfaction was ever given at *Madrid*, upon Com-
 plaint made of these *Affronts* and *Threatnings*; so, af-
 ter it, all *Honours*, *Profits* and *Trusts* were heap'd upon
 him, in a Degree hardly ever known.

And it was but reasonable to conclude from hence,
 That, as the Court of *Spain* had verifed one Part of
 his publick Discourses at *Vienna*, by demanding *Gi-
 braltar*, so the Aggrandizing and honouring him in
 so extravagant a Manner, without so much as the least
 Disavowal of his Behaviour at *Vienna* towards the
 King of *Great Britain*, was a Sort of Declaration, in
 Effect, that his whole Conduct, of which this was so
 remarkable a Part, was not only not displeasing at
Madrid, but perfectly agreeable to the main Design
 and Tendency of the new Alliance, begun, conducted,
 and finish'd by this very Man at *Vienna*. And in-
 deed,

deed, daring as *Ripperda* was, yet it is hardly conceivable that he would have dared to have treated his *Britannick Majesty* in that insolent Manner, had he not known it to be agreeable to the Tenor of the *New Alliance*; and been well assured he should be supported in it.

These were all *Suspensions*, or something stronger than *Suspensions*, built upon *Appearances* that could have no Interpretation put upon them, and could have no *Meaning nor Consistency* in them, unless upon the Supposition of another *Treaty* between the *Emperor* and *Spain*, besides that made publick to the World. But we can still carry this Matter from *Suspicion* to *Certainty*. For,

9. As there are Times and Seasons, when the Discovery of Secrets may be thought to be of such singular Use, as to countervail all the Inconveniencies of doing it; so it happened in this Case. *Ripperda*, now his Catholick Majesty's Prime Minister at *Madrid*, thought it of the highest Importance to use all Means to prevent the Accession of the *Dutch* to the *Treaty of Hanover*. And when he saw that other Methods failed of this Effect upon the *Dutch Ambassador* there, he had Recourse to those which he thought would terrify the *States*, in their present Situation, from all Thoughts of doing it. At the Beginning therefore of *February 1724*. with the utmost Seriousness and Positiveness, he assured both the *British* and *Dutch* Minister at that Court, That there was a *Secret Offensive Treaty* between *Spain* and the *Emperor*, in which they had obliged themselves mutually to support one another in their several Demands. And of this Treaty he told them three particular Articles. I. That the *Emperor* was to assist *Spain*, in the obtaining *Gibraltar*. II. That *Spain* was to support the *Emperor* in his *New Establishment* of the *Ostend Company*. III. And the

the Third was an Article to settle the *Quotas* of *Money* on one Side, and *Soldiers* on the other, for the Purposes of this *secret Treaty*. This was to influence the *Dutch* to judge that it would be in Vain to endeavour to alter or unsettle that *Offend Trade*, which was so resolved upon, and so guarded.

M. de Ripperda might have added another secret Engagement, into which the Courts of *Vienna* and *Madrid* had entered, viz. to undertake the placing the Pretender on the Throne of *Great Britain*, and to begin with that Enterprize, before they proceeded to the Execution of their further Projects for involving all *Europe* in War and Confusion. Of this Engagement the Court of *Great Britain* received such certain Intelligence from several Quarters, that it is no more to be doubted, than these Particulars of the secret Offensive Alliance avowed and declared by *M. de Ripperda*.

M. de Ripperda's professed Discovery of a secret *Treaty*, was soon farther confirmed by what followed; An Account of this frank and open Discovery was immediately sent to the Court of *Great Britain*. And, at the opening of the last Session of *Parliament*, A Noble Person in an high Station, agreeably to that Regard he owed to his Country, and to the Satisfaction due to that *August Assembly*, of which He was a Member, publicly declared it, in the House of *Lords*, as an undoubted Truth, and what *Ripperda* had own'd, That there was a secret Offensive Alliance between the *Emperor* and *Spain*, which contained *Articles* in it destructive of the Rights of *Britain*, both with Regard to its *Possessions* and its *Commerce* abroad. This positive and undisguised Declaration in *Parliament*, made a great Noise without Doors; and upon the Signification of this to the Court of *Vienna*, The *Imperial Resident* here was ordered

ed to give Satisfaction to the *British* Court, upon this Subject. Accordingly he came to some of His Majesty's Ministers, and read out of a Paper the Words which he said were the Contents of the Article which His Master had enter'd into, relating to *Gibraltar*: The which implied, that his Master had engaged to use His good Offices for the Restitution of *Gibraltar*. And this was ordered to be produced, as a full and satisfactory Proof, that there was no such Thing, as a secret *Offensive Alliance* between the two *New Allies*. One would think indeed, that no such *Effect* could possibly have been intended by this Proceeding, or expected from it. For, as upon this Occasion, it might have been naturally and justly expected, as a Thing absolutely necessary to the Vindication of the Court of *Vienna*, that the *Imperial Resident* here should have been order'd to have shewn likewise what followed immediately this Article; and indeed the Treaty it self, of which it was a Part: And as neither of these was ordered or suffered to be done, the Whole of this taken together, will prove the Truth of that very Imputation which the Court of *Vienna* designed by this Step to vindicate it self from, as from something unjustifiable and dishonourable.

If from *Vienna* we go back once again to *Madrid* we shall find still more Evidences of a *secret Treaty*: For just about the same Time that *Ripperda* spake so openly to the two Ambassadors, the King of *Spain* himself wrote a Letter to the *States General*, for the same Purpose of keeping them from acceding to the Treaty of *Hanover*; which was read in the *Assembly* of the *States of Holland*, Feb. 8. N. S. 1725. In this He acquaints Them, That "he stands obliged
" to assist his Imperial Majesty, in Case of a War,
" or Insult — which He will perform — making
" it

“ it a common Cause - holding for Enemies; “ Those who shall be Enemies of his Imperial Majesty”. All which, as denounced to the States, who had no Uneasiness with the Emperor, but on Account of the *Ostend Company*, must regard only That; and can have no Meaning but this, That, if the *Dutch* should act, merely in their own Defence, and in Support of their own Rights, against that Company; His Catholic Majesty had entered into an Engagement to assist the Emperor, and support the *Ostend Company* by Force, if needful; as it was explained by that King’s Minister himself at the *Hague*, in a Declaration made by Him, “ That His Catholic Majesty would look upon whatever should be undertaken against the *Ostend Company*, as done against himself”. This is an open owning of a Treaty, besides That already Publick; and of an Engagement in it to support the *Ostend Company* by Force.

To proceed, When about Two Months after the first Declaration made by *Ripperda*, it was represented at *Madrid* how much the Court of *Great Britain* was surprized at this open Discovery, made to the Two Ambassadors, of a secret Offensive Treaty: No other Reply could be obtained, but, in general Words, That the Court of *Spain* still desired the Friendship of *Great Britain*; and that the Engagements enter’d into at *Vienna*, would not hinder this. Nor could any thing that was urg’d, move that Court, either to own this secret Treaty; or at all to deny it. Very soon after this, the two Ambassadors thought it proper to have a Conference with *Ripperda*; in which he began a little to shuffle, and to interpret away what he had said of an Offensive Treaty, by endeavouring to perswade them, That it was little more than a Defensive One. But being press’d by

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by *Both*, who agreed in what he had before told them; and required peremptorily to answer, whether he had not declared to Them expressly that there was a *secret Offensive Alliance* between the *Emperor* and *Spain*, he answered, *That he had told them so*; and added, *that all he had told them was true*. And how indeed could he possibly deny it, since there was not a *Foreigner* of any Distinction at *Madrid*, who had not heard him, without Reserve, declare the same about this *secret Offensive Alliance*? And whom can we believe in such a Case, if not a Prime Minister so often affirming a Matter of Fact to so many; whilst neither the *King* his *Master*, nor any of his other *Ministers* at that Time denied it; or at all look'd as if they had any Thoughts then of denying it?

And once more, when an Application was made at *Madrid*, from the *British Court*, with Relation particularly to the Part which *Spain* appeared now to take in the Affair of the *Ostend Trade*; at first nothing was avowed, but an Obligation to use *Good Offices* for accommodating that Affair. But, when a *Proposal* was offer'd, which the Court of *Spain* acknowledged to be a very *reasonable* one; and when upon that it was urg'd, That, since this *Proposal* was thought a *reasonable* One, if the Imperial Court should refuse to listen to it, this would be a *just Reason* why *Spain* should not support the *Emperor* any farther in what *Spain* it self judg'd to be unreasonable: It was answer'd, "This could not be allowed; For *Spain* must stand by its *Engagements* with the *Emperor*." This was a plain Acknowledgment of farther *Engagements*, and of another Sort, than those of a *Friendly Accommodation*; and, by just Consequence, of a *secret Offensive Treaty*. For such *Engagements* must be enter'd into by *Treaty*;

ty; and this *Treaty* must be distinct from *that* already published, which does not contain them; and it must be an *Offensive Treaty*, because it is in Support of an Invasion made upon the *Rights* of others, and in Opposition to Those who act only in *Defence* of those *Rights* founded upon the most solemn *Treaties*.

After all this, it is too late for the *Court of Spain* to sink the Credit of this *Discovery* made by *Ripperda* to the two Ambassadors; or to think of destroying the Credibility of what this Court it self has given Testimony to. All the *Circumstances* of this Affair, as I have related them, make it too plain to be now evaded: And all who knew any Thing of *Publick Affairs*, will look upon what I have now produced, as a positive and convincing *Evidence* of what before was only a strong *Suspicion*.

This therefore, we are too sure of, That the now publick *Treaty of Peace*, made at *Vienna*, was it self enter'd into without the least Provocation from the *Mediators*, in Contradiction to an *Express Article* of the *Quadruple Alliance*, appointing this *Mediation* alone for the adjusting remaining Differences; cover'd all the Time at *Madrid* with the smoothest Language, and the pretended earnest Desire of proceeding still at *Cambray*; and made up of Articles so dishonourable to *Spain*, that nothing can account for them, but the *Supposition* of another, and this an *Offensive Treaty*, yet private: That this is not only *Supposition* upon *Conjecture*; but is proved to us, by Arguments too strong to be denied; the repeated Affirmation of Him who was made Prime Minister of *Spain* after he had made this *Treaty*; the Acknowledgments in Effect of the Two Courts themselves of *Vienna* and *Madrid*, with regard to *Gibraltar*, and the *Offend Trade*; and the Order from *Vienna* for producing

producing at *London* an *Article* of a *Treaty*, in such Words and in such a Manner, as makes it impossible to doubt of the Reality of it.

We will now see what Light we can get into the Nature of This so certain *Offensive Alliance*; and the other *Treaties* between the *Emperor* and *Spain*; and in what Manner *We* Our selves are likely to be affected by *them*; with regard to, the great and only Security of all Our other good Things, the present *Protestant Royal Family*; with regard to the Possessions of *Great Britain* in *Spain*, with regard to the settled Rights and Privileges of the Nation in *Trade* and *Commerce*; and indeed, in consequence of these, with regard to our being, or not being, at all, a Nation worth existing. If after this, we extend our View farther, We shall see what is likely to be the Fate of *Europe*; and what will become of the Balance of Power, if the main Designs projected in this late Alliance at *Vienna*, should be permitted to take effect. This Enquiry is the only way to our making a true Judgment of the Steps taken by *Britain*, and the Powers in Alliance with it. And when we have done this, ——— *Let them that are Blind, be Blind still.*

I. The first Enquiry which will offer it self, upon this Occasion, to the Mind of every True Briton, will arise from the Interest We all have, in the preservation of our present *Protestant Establishment*; and our concern to find out how *This* is already, or will probably be, affected by this *New Alliance*.

I know very well how easy and how common it is, to laugh at the Name of the *Pretender*, whenever it is mentioned upon such Occasions; as a Political *Rugbear*, or *Scare-crow*; a mere Word of

Alarm; or a Puppet to be play'd by *Statesmen* at their Pleasure, and whenever their Designs require it. But it would be very unfortunate for *Great Britain*, and end in the total Ruin of *Us* and our *Posterity*; if Those who are at the Helm, should suffer themselves, at the Pleasure of such as wish them no good, to be laugh'd out of that Care and Wakefulness which their *King* and their *Country* require of them. There is not a Day, nor an Hour, in which the necessity of Attention to this great Point, does not appear: Nor is there, I fear, any *Crisis* of Affairs in *Europe* possible, at this time, without *This* bearing a great part in it. And therefore, when a Breach with a *Protestant King* of *Great Britain*, who loves his *Subjects* too honestly to give up their greatest Concerns to the Demands of any Power upon Earth, is thought convenient and useful; no one can help concluding, from the known Principles of the Courts of *Vienna* and *Madrid*, that the Moment They resolved upon entering into an *Alliance* so injurious to his *Britannick Majesty*, and so destructive to the Interests of *Britain*: the same Moment another Resolution must also be taken: the Resolution of giving His *Majesty* all the uneasiness they could, even in his highest Right; and either forcing Him by this means to *Their Terms*; or preparing the way for a *King* of *Britain* after their own Hearts, from whom they may expect all Submission and Compliance. But this is only a probable Argument. Let us come now to *Facts*.

I have already mentioned some Preliminaries; the Journey of *Wb---n* to *Vienna*, and his Conduct and Intrigues and Encouragements there; as well as *Ripperda's* threatening *King George* with the *Pretender*, before he left *Vienna*, But afterwards
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the *Appearances* of a settled *Design* against His Majesty and His Royal Family, soon began to thicken apace; and the *Intelligences* about it to be very positive, from all the Friends of *Great Britain*, at almost every Court of *Europe*.

In the first Place, according to what had been before concerted at *Vienna*, the D--- of *Wk---n*, with Letters Recommendatory from young *Ripperda*, went for *Rome*, directly to the Spanish Minister residing there. By this Minister, he was introduced to the Pretender. In the Pretender's House, he was kept close shut up for Six Days; to hide, if possible, his being there: and, after very close Conference, was posted away to *Madrid*, where old *Ripperda*, his great and intimate Friend, was now in high Credit and Honour.

Thither he came with *Credentials* from the Pretender; and, as a publick Mark of Confidence in him, adorn'd with a Garter, and a new Title; and was very kindly entertain'd at *Madrid*, with these open Distinctions of Treason and Perjury upon him. And tho' it was often said, and promised and sworn to, by *Ripperda*, that this New Agent should be sent away in twenty four Hours time; and as strongly sworn to, that he never admitted him, nor ever would, into his Company; yet he still remain'd at *Madrid* without any Mark of displeasure; and was known to be frequently with *Ripperda* himself in close Conference. His intimacy with Count *Koningssec*, the Imperial Minister at *Madrid*, and the freedom of his Visits to him, were very remarkable, at a time when he profess'd himself to come into *Spain*, on no other Errand but the Pretender's Service; and this, without reserve to the *English* themselves at *Madrid*, who were in the Friendship, and even in the Service, of the Crown

Crown of Britain. This made it certain, that the business of these frequent Meetings with Persons of Character, both in the *Spanish* and *Imperial* Service, could be no other, than that which brought him to *Madrid*. At the same time the late Duke of *Ormond* was admitted to frequent *Audiences* at Court: in which no one could think that the Interests of his Master were forgot. On the contrary, Now it was that several Projects for the Execution of what was the sole End of *Wh---n's* Journey to *Madrid*, were laid before the Court of *Spain*, to be weighed and considered in their several Probabilities.

What can the greatest Well-wisher to this *New Alliance* say, in Apology for this Conduct of the Court of *Spain*; as well these Audiencies given now to the late Duke of *Ormond*, as the Reception the D--- of *Wh---ton* was favour'd with, at a Time when he came directly commission'd by the *Pretender*; and never attempted to hide the full Intent of his Journey? What can any one say, who will but read the *sixth* Article of the Peace of *Utrecht*? in which, the *Catholick King* doth Promise, as well in his own Name, as in that of his Heirs and Successors, that they will not any Time disturb or molest the Queen, her Heirs and Successors of the Protestant Line, being in Possession of the Crown of Great Britain, and the Dominions subject thereunto; neither will the aforesaid Catholick King, or any of his Successors, give at any Time any Aid, Succour, Favour or Counsel, directly or indirectly, to any Person or Persons, who on any Cause or Pretence should hereafter endeavour to oppose the said Succession by open War, or by any Conspiracies against such Prince and Princes, possessing the Throne of Great Britain, by Virtue of the Acts of Parliament made there. And, since his present

sent Majesty came to the Throne, in *Art. V.* of the *Quadruple Alliance* (to which *Quadruple Alliance* the present King of Spain acceded, before the opening of the Congress at Cambray) his Catholick Majesty (as the Emperor had done before) binds himself, his Heirs and Successors, to maintain and guaranty the Succession in the Kingdom of Great Britain, as established in the House of his Britannick Majesty now reigning; as likewise to defend all the Dominions and Provinces possessed by his Majesty; and not to give and grant any Protection or Refuge to the Pretender (there described) or his Descendents, nor any Succour, Counsel, or Assistance whatsoever, directly or indirectly. And to observe the same [*i. e.* not to give Reception, Succour, &c.] with regard to those who may be order'd or commission'd by the said Person [*the Pretender*] to disturb the Government of his Britannick Majesty, or the Tranquillity of his Kingdoms, &c. Let but the late and present Conduct of the Court of Spain be compared with these express Stipulations; and every Reader may be left to make his own Inferences from such a Comparison. To return:

The Evil I was speaking of, was not to rest in Words or Schemes; nor were the Projects I have mentioned only proposed in *Theory*: Preparations were actually made in Spain, to put the determin'd Purpose in Execution: Of which Preparations I will enumerate certain Particulars that could not be concealed.

In February 1725, a Resolution was taken to send a Body of Troops, consisting of 12000 Men, to the Coasts of Galicia and Biscay. There were at that Time at Cadix several Spanish Ships, that were plainly design'd for an Imbarkation: Two of them were of 70 Guns, one of 64, one of 56, one of

26, and one of 24; and all victuall'd for a Hundred Days. And at *Cadiz*, it *now* was, that 4800 Arms were known to have been bought, and destin'd to the *Pretender's* Service. His Majesty's Minister at *Madrid* did, indeed, upon the Discovery made to Him of the Place where they lay in Pawn for a certain Sum, take effectual Care, by first laying down that Sum, and afterwards paying their whole Price, to keep them out of the Hands of the first Purchasers, who earnestly sollicit'd to have them, and frequently offer'd the Money which had been lent on them. For he knew from undoubted Intelligence, the Purpose They were intended for. Besides these ships at *Cadiz*, there were likewise then in *Spain*, three *Russian* Men of War, one of 64 Guns, and the other two of about 40 Guns each, equipp'd some Time before from *Petersburgh*, which came to *Cadiz* in the Beginning of *Winter* 1725, to carry on the Pretence of Merchandize; but in *December* went from thence to *St. Andero*, and lay there the three following Months.

As to these three Ships, the Court of *Great Britain*, some time after they sail'd from *Petersburgh*, made a full Discovery by Letters from the *Pretender's* Agent there, and others concerned in this Transaction, which fell into their Hands; that they had been fitted out at the Expence of the *Pretender's* Friends, with the Privy of the Court of *Petersburgh*, and sent to *Spain* to be employed in an Expedition for the *Pretender's* Service; and that five more had been contracted for, and were design'd to follow. And accordingly, at the Time of their passing the *Sound*, so very particular a Joy was express'd at *Stockholm*, by a certain Party there, that it could not but be remark'd by the Friends of *Great Britain* at that Place. And in their Passage,
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when they lay in the North of *Scotland*, and afterwards were driven by Strefs of Weather into *Ireland*; his Majesty's Officers belonging to the Customs, who, according to their Duty, went on Board, found all the Symptoms of Enmity to his Majesty; all possible Tokens of a warlike Design; and all the Fears of a Discovery that could shew themselves. And after these Ships were safe in *Spain*, it was given out by one of the Greatest Men in the Court of *Russia*, and written by another Great Man, from his Mouth, to *Stockholm*, in order to influence the *Swedes*, "That the Alliance of *Britain* and *France* would be of the less Moment; "since the *Imperial Court*, and the Pretender's Measures in *Spain* would now find those two Powers "full Employment." And it was likewise after the safe Arrival of these *Russian* Ships at *St. Andero*, and during their Stay there, that the Motions and Projects of the Pretender's Friends grew more and more vigorous in *Spain*. Not only the late Duke of *Ormond* admitted to frequent Audience at this Juncture, but one *Connock*, the Pretender's constant Minister at *Madrid*, hardly ever out of *Ripperda's* House; and one *Pomphilly*, lately come from *England*, offering Money to all the Broken Officers he could meet with at *Madrid*; (as several of them freely affirm'd, and particularly a *Swiss Protestant*, One of those to whom the Offer was made) and this professedly upon a Design then on Foot, in Favour of the Pretender.

From the Mention of these particular Preparations, I pass on to shew what Use was intended to be made of the whole. So early as in *February 1725-6*, 12000 Men (as has been said above) were designed to be sent to the Coasts of *Galicia* and *Biscay*, the first Project of the Court of *Madrid* being

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to make an Attempt on his Majesty's Dominions from those Parts. But as such a Body of Troops could not at that Juncture march thither, without giving an Alarm; the Pretence for it, made use of by the Court of *Spain*, was, that they had certain Intelligence of a Resolution taken by the Court of *Great-Britain* to land a Number of Troops in that Part of the Country; who were to burn and destroy all before them, and even the Shipping in all the Harbours. Under the Cover of this pretended Intelligence, which no one in *England* could possibly give, and which no one at *Madrid* could really believe, the March of these Forces was ordered. But his Majesty's Minister at *Madrid* representing to the Duke of *Ripperda* (who was then Prime Minister, and in the highest Degree of Trust and Confidence with the King his Master,) that such Intelligence could have no Foundation, and even that such a Design from *England* was impossible; *Ripperda* promised the March of those Troops should be forborn, till a Declaration from the *British* Court, to the Purpose of what Mr. *Stanhope* had said, could be obtained. But the true Reason of delaying this March, was, that some of the Pretenders Friends had represented to the Court of *Spain*, that the sending of 12000 Men to *Galicia* and *Biscay*, without any Colour of Necessity for them, in a Country where there never used to be above two or three Battalions, would give such an Alarm to *England* as would inevitably put us upon our Guard; and therefore it would be more eligible to order that Body of Troops to *Navarre*, on a very natural Pretext of securing that Frontier against *France* but when there, they would be so near *Guipuscoa*, that they might be ready to embark, on very short Notice, in Transports to be provided at
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a Port of that Province; and be convoyed from thence by a number of Men of War, of which those three *Muscovite* Ships were to be Part. They proposed at the same Time, that some few Ships should be sent with Arms from *Cadix* directly to *Scotland*; and a Body of 6000 Men kept ready by the Emperor at *Ostend*.

But the Court of *Spain*, being soon after perfectly informed, that such vigorous Resolutions were taken, and such Preparations and Dispositions made, by *Great-Britain*, that it was in vain for them to hope for any success at that Time from such an Attempt; they suspended for the present the putting this Design into Execution; the rather, finding themselves obliged to send Part of their Ships from *Cadix* and *S. Andero* to the *West-Indies*: And the *Muscovite* Ships returned home.

Thus in fact stood the *Case*, in favour of the *Pretender*, at the Court of *Madrid*, before the *Vigorous Measures* of *Great-Britain* alter'd it. And, who that considers the whole of this, will be moved by any the strongest *Verbal Asseverations* of that Court, against such Facts; when it is remember'd, That this whole Scene of the *New Alliance*, which is acknowledged to be framed against our *Trade*, and our Right to *Gibraltar*, was begun and carried on to Perfection, under the Colour of the Highest Regards to his Majesty; and accompanied all along with the strongest and most pathetick Assurances of *Friendship*?

Especially, if we add here, what ought to alarm the *British Court*, and was sufficient itself to justify all their *Earliest Precautions* and *Preparations*; viz. That soon after the publishing the *Vienna-Treaties* of *Peace* and *Commerce*, They had positive Intelligence; and Intelligence from more than one Per-

son; and such as could be entirely depended on; That one express Article of this *Alliance* between the *Emperor* and *Spain* contain'd an Obligation in *Favour of the Pretender*; and a Stipulation to make the Attempt for him in *England*, before opening the War in any other Parts, And by as undoubted Intelligence it was added, That the *Pretender*, in return, had since oblig'd himself to restore *Gibraltar* and *Portmahon* to the *Crown of Spain*; to be Guarantee of the *Emperor's Ostend-Trade*; and lay open the Commerce, in our *Plantations* abroad, to their Ships, with the same Privileges as the *English* themselves enjoy. And for this *Article*, enter'd into by the *Emperor* with the *King of Spain*, for the Service of the *Pretender*, there is as certain Evidence, as of the being of a *Secret Treaty*: Of which I cannot think it possible to doubt, after what has been, and will be, said upon the *Articles of Gibraltar* and the *Ostend-Trade*.

This brings our Thoughts to the Court of *Vienna*, for this *Article* touches the *Imperial Court*, equally with that of *Spain*; and proves the *Pretenders Cause*, to be the Concern of the Former, as truly as of the Latter; and to be made so by an express Stipulation in a *Treaty*. And this alone is Evidence enough of the worst Disposition towards a *King* and a *Nation*, which have not deserved such a Return from *Vienna*. For, this single Point being certain; it will be of small Importance, to alledge the Conduct of this Court in not giving such publick Tokens of this Disposition, in *Fact*, as the *Other* has done; which will only shew a cautious *Prudence* in the *Execution*, but not at all any *Innocence*, or *Ignorance*, of such *Designs*. The *Article* alone demonstrates the *Design*: and that is sufficient.

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But indeed, if, *after this*, We consider the most publick Parts of the late Conduct of the *Imperial Court* towards this Nation; we cannot conclude less than This, That there is little Desire or Thought *there*, of keeping any Terms with us, in any Respect: I mean, that Part of Conduct, which regards our *Trade*, not only by Consequence, but directly and immediately, At *Ostend*, and the *Netherlands*, the present and future Fatal *Effects* of the *New Establishment* are too visible; at the same *Ostend*, which was conquered and preserved by our *Arms* and those of the *Dutch*. In *Sicily*, rescued from the *Spaniard* by our *Fleet*, as well as secured to the *Emperor*, by the good Offices of our King in the Treaty of *London*; In the same *Sicily*, the kindness was soon returned by a *Prohibition* of all our *Woollen Manufactures*; and this *Prohibition* not yet removed, but only *suspended* for a while, upon the strongest *Representations*, and the plainest Evidence, that this Proceeding was against the *Faith* of *Treaties*, which made the *British Privileges* there, exactly the same, as in all other *Dominions* of *Spain*, to which it once belonged: Those same *Treaties*, under which the Duke of *Savoy*, at the Peace of *Utrecht*, took Possession of this Kingdom of *Sicily*; and under which the present *Emperor* took it after him. And lately, in the *Austrian Dominions* in *Germany*, preserved from Ruine by the *Arms* and Money of Us and our Allies, most Species of our *Manufactures* are prohibited. So that in every Inch of Ground His *Imperial Majesty* is possessed of; even in those Countries gained by our Assistance, and where He is as closely bound by particular *Treaties* as the most solemn and repeated Engagements can bind him; In all, He has acted the same part towards Us, in one of our tenderest Concerns. And if the

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Imperial Court be resolved to go on in these Paths; This alone must determine them to espouse the *Pretender's Interest* : as They are fully assured of His present Majesty's firm Resolution never tamely to give up the Rights and Privileges of this Nation, in so essential a Point as that of Trade.

But I have done; and I am sure, have said enough upon this *first Point*, to put it beyond all Doubt, that this *New Alliance* at *Vienna* contains in it; and will certainly bring after it, if not vigorously opposed, the most unspeakable Evil to *Great Britain*; by engaging, and attempting, to subvert our present happy Establishment.

II. I will now say a Word or two about the Possessions of *Great Britain* within the *Spanish Dominions*; and how They must be affected by this *new Alliance*. These are *Gibraltar*, and *Port-Mahon*; won by our Arms in lawful War; ascertained to us as our Property by all the Parties concerned in that War; and secured to us by all the Solemnity of Alliances, and Treaties, and particularly by this present *King of Spain* himself, in two express Articles of the *Treaty of Peace* signed at *Utrecht*, 1713. For, of the great Importance especially of One of them (I mean *Gibraltar*) I would not be thought to speak as any the least Motive to a just and brave People to value and preserve it, were not the Possession of it founded upon the strictest Right, and the most undeniable Maxims of Political and National Justice. But when that Importance, to which *Spain* gives testimony by the Eagerness discovered to wrest it out of our Hands, is added to the *Right of Possession* : No one amongst us, who is a true Lover of his Country, can be easy under the Prospect of an *Alliance*, which opened it self to *Great Britain*, with the Civil

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Complement from *Spain* of demanding *Gibraltar* immediately, as the Condition of the Continuance of a Friendship, which cannot be violated without the Breach of all Faith and Trust in *Treaties*; and with the *Emperor's* Obligation, to use His kind Help to bring *Britain* to a Compliance with that Demand. I have already spoke of this Demand, and this Obligation, as certain Evidences of a *secret Offensive Alliance* between the *Emperor* and *Spain*. I now speak of this *mutual Engagement* between these two Powers, for the Recovery of *Gibraltar*, as one of the unjust and pernicious Conditions of their new Alliance. And, after I have before so plainly proved, That this *Engagement* makes one main part of it; not only from *Ripperda's* repeated Affirmation both at *Vienna* and at *Madrid*; but from the peremptory Language used at *Madrid* after this Alliance at *Vienna*; and from the Testimony from *Vienna* added to This, that there was an *express Article* containing the *Emperor's* Stipulation upon this Head; and this *Testimony* given at *London*, by order of the Imperial Court, in a very remarkable manner. After the Proof of this Fact, I need say no more than that, if the Designs of this Alliance be not vigorously opposed and effectually broke, the first unwelcome Evil to *Great Britain* must be, To see a place of the utmost Importance to us, if we will trust the Confession both of *Friends* and *Enemies*, wrested from us by Force (if it be possible) unless we will basely yield it up to the importunity of Those who ask it; and a Place, which is our Honour, and our Strength abroad; a great Defence and Advantage to our extended Navigation; and a Convenience to our Ships, of all sorts, not to be equalled by any other Place, that can be offered by that *Crown*, which would deprive us of it.

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III. But indeed this *Place*, could it be preserved to us by all our Strength and Prudence, would be of no Importance to us hereafter, if the other Schemes of This *New Alliance* stand good. It will be a small Comfort to *Great Britain*, and little better than a *Ridicule*, to have in Possession so great a Convenience to Shipping and Trade as *Gibraltar* is, if we are to be stripped of that Trade itself, and to be reduced to the Condition of having little or no Occasion for any Shipping at all. And yet, This I think must be the Case with us, if the Projects of this *new Union* are suffered quietly to succeed. For our *Trade* itself, that Ornament and Support of *Great Britain*, must by Degrees be so affected, in almost every Branch of it, that it cannot but naturally Lessen, Flag and Dye, just in Proportion as this *New Alliance* gains Strength and flourisheth. There can be little Hope, if this Conjunction proceeds much farther, of obtaining any Redress for the many Injuries in Commerce already received, or of preventing many more from the Side of *Spain*; and much less, if possible, of keeping the Designs at *Osford* from having Effect; which, taken with all their extended ill Consequences towards almost all the Branches of our Trade, are enough to awaken all *Britons*, who have been used to esteem their Commerce as their darling Good: — a Good, to the Support and Increase of which, all their *Treaties* and *Alliances* have for many Years past solely tended; and in Comparison of which, they have despised and left to Others the *Acquisition* of Tracts of Land, and *Territories* to enlarge Dominion and Power. Hitherto we have always shewed our selves sensible, that *Trade* was our proper Life; and the Encouragement of this, upon an honourable Bottom, the proper Nourishment of that Life. Every Instance of Conduct in any in Power at Home, which has but seem'd to

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shake it a little, or to touch it, at a Distance, in an unkindly Manner, has been found to be so resented, as to disunite the greatest Friends, and at once to unite those of different Views amongst us, in a vigorous Opposition to it. And every Step, in order to defend and promote it, has been received with universal Applause, and reconciled and enlarg'd the Affections of Men to such Benefactors. And with regard to Foreign Nations, every Hurt any of them do to our Commerce; every Breach into the Fences and Privileges with which that is guarded and enrich'd; every Shadow of a Tendency this Way, has always been view'd here, as the highest of all Injuries to this Nation, and the natural Subject for the genuine and just Resentment of every *True Briton*. And if we are not dead to all this Sense; if we still retain the proper Life and Vigour of *Britons*, that is, of a Nation adorn'd and supported by the most extended Commerce that can be boasted of by any People. What can we think of an Alliance between two powerful Princes, form'd against the plain Stipulations of *Treaties*, in order to deprive us of our Glory, our Riches, our Strength, which depend all upon our Trade; and afterwards, to defend and preserve themselves in their Acquisitions of our Rights?

These are not Words without a Meaning, nor Fears merely of Imagination, set on Work by present Resentment; but Real, Substantial and Undeniable: For, if the Union of these two Powers proceeds upon the present Foot, and be not thoroughly broken in its terrible Parts, let any one say what Hope can remain of any Bounds to be set to the Injuries our Trade has felt, and must feel? Will those *Depredations* and *Hostilities*, committed in the *West Indies* by the *Spaniards*, under Pretence of their Right to guard against clandestine Trade; Those Violences,

by which the whole Commerce of *Jamaica* has been well nigh destroyed, and the Trade of that Island reduced to a miserable Condition, be now redressed? Or, will the Remonstrances of these Grievances, which have had no Effect before the Treaties of *Vienna*, now, after such Treaties are made, meet with any better Reception at *Madrid*, and procure us a more favourable Answer? Will any Complaints, or Representations, in support of the acknowledg'd Rights of the *South Sea Company*, obtain now so much as a Hearing at the Court of *Spain*, when the Strength of such an Alliance is added to the former Disinclination towards any Redress; and is suffered by the other Powers of *Europe* to exert itself? Or, will they who have been hitherto unmoved by Right and Justice, at length voluntarily listen to their Voices? Or, will the Court of *Vienna*, which has stood out before this Alliance, against all Sollicitations, relinquish the Pretensions at *Ostend*, and act agreeably to former Treaties in the Affair of Commerce; now after the Riches of *Spain* are to come in to the Aid of former Resolutions?

So far from this, that it is an express Article, stipulated in this *New Alliance*, That, as the *Emperor* is to assist *Spain* in the re gaining of *Gibraltar*; so is *Spain* obliged to support the *Emperor* in his *Ostend Company*, and his Commerce.

This Article, relating to the *Ostend Company*, as Part of a *Secret Offensive Alliance*, (as I have before shewn) was more than once not only acknowledg'd, but boasted of, to the *British* and *Dutch* Ministers at *Madrid*, by *Ripperda*, when he was prime Minister in *Spain*. But we have not only this Evidence; for, as in the Affair of *Gibraltar*, the *Emperor* himself, by producing an Article of a Treaty, gave Testimony to his having enter'd into *Engagements* relating

to that Place; so his *Catholick Majesty* has not scrupled to give his own Testimony, that, by this *New Alliance*, He has entered into Engagements to support the *Emperor* in his Establishment of the *Ostend Company*; not only by the Language of his Court at *Madrid*; but by what he wrote himself, and ordered his *Minister* at the *Hague*, to denounce, by way of Threatning to the *States General*, upon this Subject; of which I have given an Account before. And besides all this, it is enough to look upon the *Publick Treaty* of Commerce sign'd at *Vienna*, *May* 1st, 1725. to be satisfied, that such Privileges in Commerce are granted by *Spain*, to the *Emperor's* Subjects, as are contrary to many former *Treaties*, and to the most manifest *Rights* of other *Nations* founded upon those *Treaties*.

I shall not enter minutely into all the Particulars which are of *Importance*, upon this Head. The Subject has been so plainly stated, and even exhausted, before the World already, that there can be no need of any thing farther, than to refer those, who have not yet look'd into the Depth of this Affair, to the several *Memorials* of the *States General*, and of those commissioned by Them, upon this Occasion; particularly those which were printed here, in the *Daily Courants* of *Decemb.* 16. 1725. *Jan.* 19. 25. *Feb.* 5. 8. 12. and 14. 1725. In which all the Pretences of their Enemies are compleatly and plainly answered; and the *Matter* placed in the most evident Light: I will only just state the *Dates* and *Intent* of the *Treaties*, relating to the *Commerce* most immediately affected, by the new *Ostend Company*; and add a Word or two about the farther Consequences of it.

So long ago as the Year 1609, the King of *Spain*, by the Truce then made with the *United Provinces*,
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granted them their first Privileges of Trade in the *East Indies*; by which the *Dutch East India Company* has been from that time in Possession of their Commerce in those Parts. But these Privileges wanted Confirmation; and this they fully obtain'd from the Crown of Spain, after long and mature Deliberation, at the Treaty of *Munster*, in the Year 1648. By which, the Crown of Spain not only granted the *Hollanders* these Privileges; but engag'd itself, to maintain and protect them, in the Enjoyment of these Privileges. In this Treaty the Bounds were set to the several Pretensions of the *Dutch* and *Castilians* in the *East Indies*; and the Limits of their distinct Navigation and Commerce there, exactly fix'd: And not only all other Subjects of Spain were totally excluded from the *East Indies*; but the *Castilians* themselves were for ever excluded from all Commerce and Navigation within the Limits of the *Hollanders*; as These were likewise prohibited from entering into those of the *Castilians*.

And, before this, the absolute Exclusion of all the Inhabitants of the *Netherlands*, from all Trade or Commerce in the *East* or *West Indies*, was in the Year 1593, made an express Article in the Act of Cession of the *Low-Countries* by *Philip II.* King of Spain, upon the Marriage of his Daughter *Isabella* to *Arch-Duke Albert*: The VIIIth Article of which Cession is this, "That the *Arch-Duke* and *Arch-Dutchess* themselves, and their Successors, shall not exercise any Navigation and Commerce in the *East* and *West Indies*, under the Penalty of being deprived of those Provinces; and if any of their Subjects shall act contrary to this, they shall be punished with Rigour, in some Cases even with Death itself, &c." Neither was this at that Time at all complain'd of, by the States of those *Low-Countries*, even when several other Conditions

ditions of the Reception of those new *Governors* were remonstrated against, as so many Grievances upon the People of those Provinces. Neither was there afterward any Protest made by any Persons concerned, against this *Exclusion*, whilst the King of Spain was concluding the Treaty of *Munster* with the *United Provinces*. This shews, That the present Complaint of the Hardship of such *Exclusion* is new and artificial, and comes many Years too late, as it comes after solemn *Treaties* made, and renewed, in express Confirmation of this *Exclusion*.

To proceed: After the Treaty of *Munster* an Accident happened, which plainly shewed how the Vth Article of that Treaty was understood, not only by the *Dutch*, but by Spain also. One *Bastien Brower*, a Subject of Spain, either of *Brabant*, or of *Flanders*, had obtained a Permission from the King of Spain, to go to the Coasts of China, where he carried on a very profitable Trade. When this came to the Knowledge of the *High-Council* in *India*, belonging to the *Dutch East-India Company*, they made a solemn *Resolution* immediately, and sent it, as an Order, to the Commanders of all their Ships, and to all their Subjects, To take this Man Prisoner; and if he defended himself, to use Force against him. This had its Effect. The Man never appeared any more to give them farther Trouble. Other Subjects of Spain desisted from all such Voyages. The Crown of Spain never complained of this Conduct; and by this Silence, plainly gave Testimony to the Justice of that *Resolution*, as founded upon the Treaty of *Munster*.

In the Year 1667, by a Treaty between *Britain* and *Spain*, all Privileges of Commerce and Navigation in both the *Indies*, were granted to his *Britannick* Majesty's Subjects, in as full and ample Manner

ner as they were granted to the *Hollanders* in the Treaty of *Munster*. And in the Year 1713, a Treaty of Commerce was concluded at *Utrecht*, between the *Queen* of *Great-Britain*, and this present *King* of *Spain*: By the Ist Article of which it is declared, "That the Treaty of Peace, Commerce and Alliance, concluded at *Madrid* in 1667, is ratified and confirmed by this Treaty:" And it is added, "That for the greater Strengthening and Confirmation of the same, it has been thought proper to insert it Word for Word in this Place." Then follows that former Treaty, thus ratified and confirmed.

In the Year 1724, but one Year before this *New Alliance* at *Vienna*, this same *King* of *Spain* was so sensible of his *Obligations*, lying upon him from the Treaty of *Munster* alone, that he presented, by his Ambassador at *London*, a Memorial against the *Emperor's* Attempts upon *Trade* from *Ostend*; in which he insisted, That the Affair of the *Ostend Company* should be brought before the Congress at *Cambray*, in order to have the said Company abolished, before he could in Conscience think of confirming the Cession of the *Netherlands* to the *Emperor*: And urges, That if this Confirmation should be made by *Spain*, "without reserving expressly to it self, the exclusive Right on the Navigation to the *Indies* in General, and without Exception; the *States-General* would be rightly entitled to demand Satisfaction of *Spain*, for having thereby made a great Infraction of the Treaty of *Munster*, and would be disengaged from the reciprocal Obligation, to abstain from the Navigation of the *Spanish Indies*." That is, in other Words, that if He, the *King* of *Spain*, should not Support the *Dutch* (and consequently the *English* also) against the

the *Emperor's* new Establishment at *Ostend*, that then, *I say*, he himself should be justly charged with a most dishonourable Breach of Faith, and Violation of solemn Treaties. Thus stand the Engagements of *Spain*, with Regard to the *English* and *Dutch*, in the Affair of their Trade to the *Indies*, and of the *Emperor's* new Attempts at *Ostend*. Let us now consider the Obligations and Engagements of the *Emperor* himself.

The *Grand Alliance* 1701, between the *Emperor Leopold*, *King William*, and the *States-General*, is built upon this very Foundation of the *English* and *Dutch* Trade to the *Indies*, as upon a main Ground of that Alliance. It opens itself with reciting, that, upon the Death of *Charles II. King of Spain*, without Issue, the *Emperor* claimed the Right of Succession to his Countries, as belonging to the *Austrian Family*; and, after other Particulars, it follows, “so that without some Remedy applied, the *Em-*”
 “*peror* will lose his Pretensions; the Empire lose

“its *Fiefs* in *Italy*; and the *ENGLISH* and *UNIT-*”
 “*ED PROVINCES* be deprived of the free Use of

“their *NAVIGATION* and *COMMERCE* in the

“*INDIES*, and other Places,” &c.

Hence it appears, 1. That the *Emperor's* Family claiming by *Hereditary Right* these *Provinces*, could not rightfully claim any *Powers*, but what were vested and remained in *Charles II. the King of Spain*, to whom they were to succeed; nor possess them, but upon the Conditions, upon which the deceased *King* himself had possessed them: And that the *Emperor* neither could, nor did claim any Thing that his Predecessors, *Kings of Spain*, had parted with by solemn Treaties; and therefore neither could, nor did, claim those Countries, but upon the same Terms and Conditions of Trade, on which *King*
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Charles II. of Spain had enjoyed them, agreeably to solemn Treaties with other Powers. 2. That the Preservation of the Trade in the *Indies*, to the *English* and *Dutch*, upon the Foot they enjoyed it, and in the Manner it was carried on, to the Death of King *Charles II. of Spain*, was one Ground, and a main one, of the *Grand Alliance*; and that the Emperor's Pretensions to the Low-Countries were supported by the *English* and *Dutch*, upon this, amongst other Conditions, that the Emperor should reciprocally support their Trade to the *Indies*, on the Foot they had constantly enjoyed it. 3. It having been already proved, that *Holland* ever since the Treaty of *Munster* in 1648, and *England* ever since the Treaty of *Madrid* in 1667, have carried on their Trade to the *East-Indies*, to the Exclusion of the Subjects of the *Netherlands*: By virtue of those Treaties; it follows, That, in Consequence of this, and by Virtue of this *grand Alliance* it self (by which the Emperor's Claim to these Countries is allowed, and the Claim of the Allies to their Commerce also insisted on) the Emperor did in Effect oblige himself and his Family, whenever in Possession of these Countries, to take upon themselves all the Obligations which the Kings of *Spain*, to whom they succeeded, were under, to *England* and *Holland*, by former Treaties; and to support this main End of the *grand Alliance*, relating to the Commerce of the Allies (expressly mentioned in it,) as well as their own Pretensions; and, instead of invading them themselves, to defend them against all *Invaders*, according to the Obligations of those former Treaties. Nay, it was likewise expressly stipulated in this *grand Alliance*, supposing it to end successfully: That the *Spanish Netherlands* should be (not in the Property of the Emperor absolutely, and without any Conditions;

ditions ; but) a Barrier to the *United Provinces*. So that we see, the Emperor, in the Grand Alliance it self, considered his own Right to the *Netherlands*, with a View to the Trade of his *Allies* ; and that the *Spanish Low-Countries* were established in that Alliance, as a *Defence* and *Guard* to those *Allies*, whose Trade is now going to be ruined from them.

But these *Obligations* are not only the real Intent and *Consequence* of the *grand Alliance* : But it is declared in exprefs Words, in the Barrier Treaty concluded at *Antwerp*, in 1715, between his present *Britannick Majesty*, this present *Emperor*, and the *States General*, Art. 1. That “the *Emperor* (this “ present *Emperor*) should enjoy the *Spanish Ne-* “ *therlands*, as they were enjoyed, or ought to have “ been enjoyed, by the late *King Charles II.* con- “ formably to the Treaty of *Ryswick*.” That is, with the *same Privileges*, and the *same Obligations*, neither greater nor less.

After all these solemn Stipulations and Treaties here recited, is it conceivable, what has now been done in the Face of the World ? ---- That *Emperor*, who was under all his Father’s *Obligations* ; who could not succeed, even by his Title of *Hereditary Right*, to these *Low Countries*, but under the same *Engagements* with those *Kings of Spain* to whom he succeeds : Who himself, in his own Person, has declared, in a solemn Treaty, that He enjoys these Countries no otherwise, than as they were enjoyed by the late *King of Spain* ; that is, under the same *Restrictions* and *Obligations* to which that *King* was engaged : That same *Emperor*, instead of protecting the Commerce of the *English* and *Dutch* from the *Invasions* of others, himself openly invades it ; instead of punishing any of his Subjects in the *Netherlands* for *Attempts of Trade* to the *East-Indies*, or re-

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straining them, as he is strictly obliged to do, He has himself *erected* a *Company*, and endowed it with *great Privileges*, on purpose to trade thither; and, instead of yielding to the just Remonstrances of his injured Neighbours, he has set them at Defiance, and strengthened himself with a *new Accession* of the Power and Riches of *Spain*, to back this unjustifiable Seizure of those Rights of *Commerce*, which are the established and peculiar Privileges of other Countries. Such has been the Conduct of the *Emperor*.

And the part which *Spain* has acted, with regard to *Ostend*, and the *Spanish Netherlands*, is, if possible, still more extraordinary, and more out of the common Road of dealing with *Treaties* and *Alliances*. For thus it is, — That King of *Spain*, who enjoys his Kingdom under the *Stipulations* of the *Treaties* made by his *Predecessors*, — who has confirmed them all himself, in his own Person: — He, who in one Year declared it would be a Breach of his *Treaties*, for him ever to acquiesce in the Establishment of the *Ostend East India Company*: That same King, the next Year, does much more than this. He undertakes, by this *new Alliance*, to support the *Emperor* in this very Establishment. Not only this, but he grants to these very *Ostenders*, and all other Subjects of the *Emperor* in the *Spanish Netherlands*, what he had no Right to grant to them, had they remained his own Subjects; nay, he grants them *Privileges* of his Ports and Places in the *Indies*, greater than are allowed to the *English* and *Hollanders* themselves: And this, not only with respect to the *East Indies*, but the *West Indies* also. For by the second and third Articles of the *Vienna Treaty of Commerce*, a Liberty is granted to them, to frequent, and Trade in, the Ports of the *Spanish West Indies*:

dies: Or, supposing this not directly granted, in exprefs Words, yet they are at least permitted to enter into those Ports for victualling or repairing their Ships: which will come to the same Thing. For if they may enter into, and remain in those Ports, till they have provided themselves with all Neecessaries, the Nature of the Bullion Trade is of that sort, that no Precaution can prevent that Commerce.

I am sensible it may be objected here, that the Liberty granted to the Emperor's Subjects, by the Treaty of *Vienna*, to enter into the Ports of *Spain* in the *West-Indies*, in case of Distress of Weather, or for refreshing themselves, &c. is no more than what was formerly granted to his Majesty's Subjects by the Treaty of *Madrid*, concluded in 1670. But it is well known, that the Liberty granted by that Treaty has ceased for many Years; and that, in order to prevent the Abuses that might be committed from such a Permission, and that one Nation might not be more favoured than another on any Pretext whatsoever in the Trade to the *West Indies*, sufficient Care was taken of that Matter in the 8th Article of the Treaty of *Utrecht*, by which it is expressly stipulated, and declared in the following Words: "Whereas among other Conditions
 " of the general Peace, it is by common Consent
 " established, as a chief and fundamental Rule,
 " that the Exercise of Navigation and Commerce
 " to the *Spanish West-Indies*, should remain in the
 " same State it was in the Time of King *Charles II.*
 " of *Spain*, and that therefore this Rule may here-
 " after be observed with inviolable Faith, and in a
 " Manner never to be broken, and thereby all Causes
 " of Distrust and Suspicion, concerning that Matter
 " may be prevented and removed; it is especially
 " agreed

“ agreed and concluded, that no Licence, or any
 “ Permission at all, shall at any Time be given to
 “ the *French*, or any other Nation whatever, in
 “ any Name, or under any Pretence, directly, or
 “ indirectly, to *SAIL*, Traffick, &c. to the Do-
 “ minions subject to the Crown of *Spain* in *America*;
 “ except what may be agreed by the Treaty, or
 “ Treaties of Commerce, (*there referred to*) and
 “ the Rights and Privileges granted in a certain
 “ Convention called, *El Assiento de Negros*. ” And
 the same Condition is likewise stipulated in the 34th
 Article of the Treaty of *Utrecht*, between the King of
Spain and the States. And there needs no other Ar-
 gument to prove, that it was always understood by
 the Court of *Spain* itself, in the Sense of not suffering
 any Ship to enter into any Port of *Spain* in the
West-Indies, on any Pretext whatever; but to ob-
 serve, That the *English* and *Dutch* are never per-
 mitted, though under the greatest Distress of Wea-
 ther, or want of Provisions, to put into any of those
 Ports; but their Ships if they come in, are con-
 stantly confiscated: And upon this very Account,
 that, if once Entrance were permitted, the Traf-
 fick could not but follow. Yet, notwithstanding
 that this is a fundamental Rule of the Treaties of *U-*
trecht, and an Article of the general Peace, which
 is strictly observed with regard to all other Nations;
 it is notoriously violated, in Favour and Preference
 of the Emperor’s Subjects.

It is further to be observed, that with Regard to
 the Articles of Commerce between *Spain*, *England*
 and *Holland*, the Liberty to the *English* and *Dutch*, of
 entering into the *Spanish* Ports, was always expressly
 restrained to the Ports of *Europe*. But no such Re-
 striction is once mentioned in the late Treaty of *Vi-*
enna, with Regard to the Emperor’s Subjects. Nay, all the

the *Privileges* allowed to *Britain*, are in exprefs Words allowed to *these*; without fo much as an Exception to the *South-Sea-Ships*, and the *Affiento Contract*: Whereas in the Treaty of *Utrecht* with the *Dutch*, that Exception was exprefly made. Thus has the King of *Spain* granted *all* our Privileges, and greater, to the Subjects of the *Emperor*; and, inftead of protecting *Great Britain*, and the *United Provinces*, in their *Rights of Commerce*, according to former Treaties, he has now declared himfelf to be obliged and determined to Protect, by Force, the *Emperor* and his Subjects, in their *Invaſion* of thoſe Rights. And, from all this put together, it muſt be as evident, as *Words* and *Facts* compared can make any thing, That the *two Courts* of *Vienna* and *Madrid* have founded their *new Alliance*, as far as it reſpects *Trade*, on the Deſtruction of all publick Faith, the *Infraction* of Treaties, and the *Violation* of all that can hold together *Nations* in Peace, and mutual Benevolence.

After ſo plain a Proof of the great *Injuſtice* of the Attempt of the *Imperial Court* upon *Trade*, from the *Spaniſh Netherlands*; and of the King of *Spain's* determined Encouragement of it: It would not be improper here to conſider at ſome length the *Importance* and *Conſequence* of this Conduct to *our ſelves*; were it not that This has been ſet in ſo ſtrong a Light already, as to make it much leſs neceſſary; and particularly, in a *ſhort Treatiſe*, Intituled, *The Importance of the Oſtend Company conſidered*. Yet, before I paſs from this Subject, I muſt mention ſome few particular Conſequences of this new Eſtabliſhment at *Oſtend*, and of the *new Treaty of Commerce* (by which ſo large Privileges are granted to the Subjects of the *Netherlands*) with Regard to our *Trade*;

Trade; and in the end to our *Liberties*, and our *Religion* themselves.

The *United Provinces*, it is plain from their whole Conduct, esteem themselves undone in their main Concern, if this *Company* be supported. And if *They* are undone in *their Trade*; it is well known to all who are acquainted with the *Track of Merchandize*, that the Gain of their Loss in Trade will not accrue to *England*, but fly to those Countries where this Evil began. As to the *East-India Trade* particularly; the same *Rival* which ruins that in *Holland*, must by the same Method inevitably ruine it in *England*. Nay, it must ruine it sooner and more effectually here; not only because *Holland* has the whole Property of the *Spice Trade*, besides other Advantages; but because the *Dutch Merchandizes* are free from the Burden of *Customs*; whilst our *Customs* give the greatest Encouragement to the *Ostenders* to run, and put off a Multitude of their Goods in *England*. The Damage and Ruine must be the same, as to our *West-India Trade*, from the *Privileges* granted by the *Vienna Treaty of Commerce* to the Emperor's Subjects; the *Privilege* of entring into the *Spanish Ports* in the *West-Indies*, and by unavoidable Consequence of trading there, where neither *English* or *Dutch* are ever permitted to enter upon any *Pretence*; and the *comprehensive Privilege* of enjoying all Rights which *Britain* enjoys, without any *Exception*; and, by Consequence, of interfering with, and hurting, not only our *Assiento Contract*, but every *Instance of Commerce* with *Spain*, which we have a Right to by repeated *Treaties*.

Nor can the Evil stop here, but must of Necessity insinuate itself into many other of the most important Branches of our *Trade*, which have a mutual and indissoluble Connexion one with another. The
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convenient Situation of the *Spanish Netherlands* between the *North* and the *South* of *Europe*, for all the Purposes of an extended Trade:— The Advantage of the Ports of *Ostend* and *Newport*, which, though none of the *best*, yet may vye with those of *Holland*; and will be as convenient Harbours for *Privateers*, as ever *Dunkirk* itself was, when the Time shall come for an avowed and forcible Interruption to *Our* Trade, and that of *Holland*: The Goodness of their *Rivers* for communicating all *Merchandizes*, at the most easie Rates, from *Town* to *Town*; and the later Addition of several large *Canals* and *Causeways*, where the *Rivers* are wanting:— The fruitfulness of the Country, and the easie Price of all Provisions, very advantageous to all Manufactures:— The *Liberties* and *Privileges* of the *Town*, which still subsist; very inviting to the same *Manufacturers*:— The *Genius* of the *People*, very well fitted for all the *Improvements* of *Trade* and Manufactures:— and, to animate them, the Experience and History of past Times, which will shew them, that they have formerly, with a little Encouragement from their Governours, flourished in *Manufactures* both *Woollen* and *Linnen* (besides those many which they still retain; the *Wollen* now again reviving to a Degree of Goodness at *Limburgh*, so as already to under-sell the *Dutch* themselves; and the *Linnen* more easily revived by the Advantage of the great Quantity of *Flax* growing in these Countries:— And this Experience of former Days, pointing out to them likewise the Possibility and probability of their carrying their *Navigation* to a great Pitch, in the *Number* and *Strength* of their *Shipping*, increasing by Degrees, as it always does in Proportion to *Manufactures* and *Fisheries*; and the faster, as these Countries lie nearer and more convenient for enticing *Fishermen* and *Sailors*,

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as well as *Manufacturers* themselves, from hence, upon all Occasions; and also for the clandestine *Importation* of *Wooll* from *England* and *Ireland*, to carry on their Designs. These, and many more Particulars shew, that, as one Branch of *Trade* leads to another, and one Trial encourages another; and as all *Commerce* is of a spreading and communicative Nature, where it meets with proper *Materials*, and proper *Encouragement*; so this must probably be the Case, if the *Beginnings* of *Evil* be not looked after: That not only our own *East* and *West-India* Trade, and that of the *Dutch*, will be ruined by the *Ostend* Company, which will be the immediate *Effect* of it; (or rather is so already in a great Degree;) but also, that the *Contagion* will spread to many other *Branches* of the *British* and *Dutch* Trade; and convey along with it the *Riches*, the *Strength*, and the *Naval* Power, to the same *Spanish Netherlands*.

But were it so, that *Holland* alone would be the Sufferer by the *Ostend* Trade (which is far from being the Case;) yet the Ruine of *Holland* must carry along with it, in the End, the Ruine of *Britain*. For, as these two Nations remaining United, are indeed the *Turn* of the Balance of *Europe*, whenever they joyn themselves to any other great Power of *Europe*; and *Both* of them together, but barely sufficient for this Purpose: Whatever Ruines the *Trade*, that is, the *Riches* and *Strength* of these, destroys at the same Time the Evenness of that Balance, which alone can keep *Europe* in any tolerable Order. And whatever Ruins any *One* of these *Powers*, does as truly destroy the Sufficiency of that *Strength*, by which alone that Balance is preserved. And what then must be the Consequence? Where the *Trade* and *Riches* of these, or of either of these, settle:

settle, *there* settles the *Power* with them; and that *Power* removed from *them*, must be the *Destruction* of the *Balance*; and the *Destruction* of that *Balance* must be the *Loss* of the *Liberties* of the *rest* of *Europe*, and particularly, as *Occasion* shall offer, of the *Liberties* of *Great Britain*.

And I need not add, that the same *Popish Power*, which will gain all this *Strength*, (for it is in a *Popish Power* that all this must Centre,) will have the same *Strength*, and a greater *Will*, to extirpate every *Appearance* of *Protestantism*, of what *Denomination* soever, out of *Europe*; without *Exception* to any one *Church* above another: only with the fatal *Exception* of a more sure and quick *Blow* to that *Church*, a great *Part* of whose *Revenues*, as well as the *Riches* of a *Multitude* of its *Members*, arise from the *Dissolution* of *Monastries*, and the *Alienation* of *Abbey-Lands*; and whose unpardonable *Crime* it will be, to have been the great *Support* of the *Reformation*, and the *Bulwark* of the *Protestant Cause* against *Popery*. For where can that *Church*, or where can the *Protestant Religion*, hope, I will not say, for *Countenance*, but for *Sufferance*; when the whole *Protestant Power* in *Europe*, which, in its present *Condition*, is little better than a *Creature* with *Pain* and *Difficulty* struggling for *Life*, shall be broken to *Pieces* by *Acquisitions*, made by other *Powers*, of *Riches* and *Force*: *Acquisitions*, which will be a double *Strength* against it, as they are taken from: Those who alone have a *Will* to protect it, and added to Those who have a *Zeal* to hurt and oppress it. And that *this* must be the *End* of such *Beginnings*, suffered to proceed with *Success*, and gathering *Strength* every *Step* they go, is as plain, and as true, as, That *proper Food* will give *Strength* gradually to the *weakest Man*,
I capable

capable of receiving it; too great to be resisted at last by the *strongest Man*, who suffers it to be taken from *himself*; and who by that Loss of *Nourishment* grows *weaker* and *weaker*, as well as by the Strength added by it to the *other*.

I will now say a Word more peculiarly relating to *Great Britain*; and the Concern this Nation has, in its present Circumstances, in the *Fate* of its *Trade*, or of *any* of the Branches of it. The two last *Wars* abroad, upon which not only our own Safety, but that of the *Liberties* of all *Europe*, depended, and by which they were preserved; together with the continual Attempts of our Enemies, since the general Peace, to load us with the Chains of *Popery* and the *Pretender*, have run *Great Britain* into a vast *Expence*: and this *Expence* has left behind it an immense *Debt*; and this *Debt*, so justly due to the *Creditors* of the *Publick*, must be paid, both out of strict Duty, if there be any such thing as *publick Justice*, and out of *Interest*, if we have a Mind ever again, in any *Extremity*, to be trusted, This lies as a great and heavy Burthen upon the Minds of all true Lovers of their Country: And, I know, that for the sake of this single Point, and from their earnest desire of seeing to great a Good accomplished, without any interruptions, Many of the best Friends to the *Publick* are ready to regret any Opposition made to the Designs of this *New Alliance*, as the first Step to a *War*; and to ask, How much better, to bear the Inconveniencies mentioned; to submit to the Loss of *Gibraltar*; to be contented with all the Consequences of the *Ostend-Trade*; to connive at all the Designs of such Powers united; than to put any Stop to our Prospect of a gradual Payment of our Debts? --- Our main Business, they argue, is to

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free our selves from that Load. The *sinking Fund* is a good Beginning; and, if not hindered by Quarrels with Powers abroad, must go on to diminish our Debt. This Payment of our Debt, we should look after, as our Strength in future Times, and our greatest Force against our *Enemies*; and not shew our selves so concerned about the Points just now mentioned.

On the other Side, I cannot help entirely differing from all this. Nay, I cannot forbear to urge this very Opposition to the *New Alliance*, as the only certain Method of taking any one Step farther towards this great Good; as so absolutely necessary, that without it, there is an End of all Hope of it. And I contend for the most vigorous Opposition to the Designs of this *New Alliance*, for this very Reason, because we are in *Debt*, and must be *for ever in Debt*, and shall never probably have it in our Power to pay any Part more of that *Debt*, if those Designs go on unopposed and unresisted.

For, in the first Place, They who argue against it, from this Consideration, leave out a *main Point*, and a Point which comprehends all other Evils in it, and that is, the *continued Attempts* of putting the *Pretender* upon us; which must succeed, unless we shew our selves determined to oppose any *Power* engaged in Support of such Designs. And if this one Thing succeeds, it is of small Importance to our Debt, what our Trade will be, after this is effected. Every one can see, that a Debt, contracted in Order to keep out *Him* and his *Family* for ever, will never be paid, but by one *universal Blot* spread over the Face of the whole Account, if *He* should ever be sett ed here, against whom this Debt has raised Armies, and mann'd Fleets, and fought many successful Battles. What Good therefore, towards the Payment of our Debt

will a supine Negligence do ? Or what Account can the Creditors of the Publick hope to find, from not opposing an Alliance which may otherwise too probably end in the establishing a *King* here, under whom the least Evil will be this, That the Creditors of the Publick will be sure of losing at once their whole just *Debt*, and the *Interest* of it ?

But, putting the *Pretender* wholly out of the *Question*, as a Person not in Being ; or, supposing our selves secure from every future Attempt in his Favour, yet the Case, with Respect to the Payment of the *Debt*, must very soon be the same ; (however it may happily differ in many other Particulars) if the Conditions of these *New Treaties* at *Vienna*, both *Publick* and *Private*, are, through our supine Negligence, suffer'd to be fulfilled. For, what is the *sinking Fund* from which we hope for Relief ? It is the *Surplus* of the *Produce* of the *Customs* and *Excises*, after the Payment of the *Civil List*, and of the *Interest* of the *National Debt*. These *Customs* are the *Appurtenances* to *Trade* and *Commerce*. Take away any Part of this *Trade*, or diminish it in any Branch, just so much in Proportion you diminish or take away from these *Customs*. The first Thing therefore, that must feel the *Diminution* of our *Trade*, is the *Produce* of our *Customs* ; and the first Thing that must feel the *Diminution* of our *Customs*, is the *sinking Fund* ; because the *Civil List* and the *Interest* of the *National Debt* must first be paid, before any *Surplus* at all can be laid apart for the Payment of the *Principal*. Let therefore your *Trade* decay ; permit the *New Company* at *Ostend* to make your own *East* and *West India* *Trade* utterly impracticable ; and suffer your own *Commerce* to be by Degrees transplanted, and to flourish in the *Netherlands*, under the Advantages and Encouragements in those Parts just now mentioned ; besides the Prohibitions

tions upon your own *Manufactures* every Day increasing upon you ; and this alone will immediately prevent any such *Surplusage* from remaining. For, what Need of Words ? As Customs are the Appendages of Trade, they must decay with it : As the *Sinking Fund* depends entirely on the Abundance of Customs, this must first vanish upon their Decrease. What then must immediately become of the *principal Debt* ? And indeed, very soon after this, what must become even of the *Interest* of it, when the Customs, which are the *Fund* for the yearly Payment of that *Interest*, are themselves vanish'd away ? And I will add, never after this to be recalled again.

For here is the real Difference between the two Methods of proceeding, now under our Consideration. First, As to that of vigorous Opposition to the Measures of the *New Alliance* ; if we should allow to those who thus argue against it, that it may possibly bring on, in its natural Course, an *Interruption* to Trade, and a *Diminution* of Customs ; and consequently a Stop to that Payment of the *National Debt* which depends upon the Abundance of these Customs : Yet this is but a *Temporary Stop*. If these vigorous Measures meet with Success and the Blessing of Providence attend upon them, the Course of Trade opens it self again with Vigour ; and the Customs reviving in Proportion, the *Sinking Fund* must of Necessity do so too. And if this Method of *Vigorous Opposition* should not be successful, the Case could not be worse than it must be without it. For in the other Method, that of supine Negligence, and of yielding to all Demands without the Attempt of any Relief ; our Conduct has but one certain Event possible, as to the Point now before us. The *Sinking Fund* must, with the Decrease of the Customs, vanish immediately ; and so must, soon after it, the Annual Interest of our Debt.

Debt. And then, the *longer* the *Offend* Company continues its Commerce, the *stronger* and more extended must it grow; and the more extended that is, the more confined must our *East* and *West India* Commerce be, in all their Branches, till they dwindle into nothing; and the more the *Sweets* of Trade are tasted in the *Spanish Netherlands*, and the *Austrian* Countries too, the more improbable or rather impossible it will be, ever to recall it into these Parts, upon any such Terms as can make the *Customs*, once ruined, revive in *England*. In a Word, in *one* Way, the Diminution of the National Debt may be interrupted by a vigorous *Opposition* to the Measures Abroad, but then will revive again, and go on in its proper Channel. In the *other* Way, the same Diminution and Loss of the Means of paying the *Debt*, and even the *Interest* of it, will be the Fate of this Nation; and that with this *unhappy* Aggravation, that, if the Loss comes *this* Way, it is never to be retriev'd, nor any Hope left of that Payment for the future.

As others therefore are moved by a Regard to this great Good to the Nation, to be averse to all Methods of *vigorous* Opposition; I cannot help being moved by the same Regard, the very contrary Way: And what they *fear*, because we have such a *Debt* upon us, which ought to be paid; that I *wish*, for the same Reason, because we are in Debt; and that *Debt* ought to be paid: And that Debt cannot be paid, without such an *Opposition*, as may preserve our Commerce upon a *Foundation* granted to it by the most solemn *Treaties*, the only *Purchase* of the *Toil* and *Expence* of *Britain*; and such a *Foundation*, as alone can enable us to go on in a gradual Justice to the *Creditors* of the Publick.

And in such a Method of Proceeding, This ought to be our great Support and Confidence, that it is
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not an arbitrary Contention against the Rights of any other Nation in the World; nor a Contest for our Trade, merely as our great Advantage, or as the Instrument of paying the National Debt, and securing the National Happiness; but really and truly a Contention for our strict Right and Due, invaded with an high Hand by other Powers, against the *Faith of Treaties*, as well as the Force of the highest Obligations. Nor can we conceive a more abject Servility of Conduct, than for a *People* so long fam'd for *Commerce* and *Bravery*, to see their *Darling Good*, and their peculiar Glory, the Pledge of their *Liberty*, and Life of all their Property, just going to be forcibly and unrighteously torn from them; and tamely to look on without *one Struggle* for so great a Blessing, or one hearty Effort against the Invaders of it. What can we become, if we give our Consent to such Ruin by our own supine Indolence and Insensibility; and suffer our selves to be stripp'd of our boasted Strength and Ornament at once; but a Nation, the most despicable of all Nations under Heaven, exposed to the Contempt and Insults of the World about us here *below*, and render'd utterly unworthy, by our own Conduct, of the Care of Providence *above* us?

IV. After all this said upon the Consequences of this *New Alliance*, with a particular Respect to the *Protestant Establishment*, the *Possessions*, and the *Commerce* of *Great Britain*; it will be very proper now to touch upon another *Article* of the *Secret Part* of it, in which not only *Britain*, but all *Europe* in general, is extremely concern'd; I mean the *Marriages* agreed upon, between the *Emperor* and *Spain*; which, added to the *comprehensive* and *extended Trade* now likely to be transplanted into the *Netherlands*, must constitute a Power in *one Family* beyond all that we have known, *Formidable* and *Irresistible*.
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The *Marriages*, I speak of, are *those* of the two *Arch-Dutchesses*, *Daughters* to the present *Emperor*, with the two *Infants* of *Spain*, *Sons* to the *King* by his present *Queen*. And that *these* are agreed upon, as a main and essential Point in this *New Alliance*, We have the following *Proofs*.

1. Immediately after the Signing the *Publick Treaty* of *Peace* at *Vienna*, *Ripperda* very freely talk'd of the *Marriage* of *Don Carlos*, the *eldest Son* of the present *Queen* of *Spain*, with the *eldest Arch-Dutchess*, as a fixt Matter; and that the *Prince* of *Asturias* was disregarded in this *Alliance*, because of his ill *Health*, as he pretended at that *Time*; and a little while after, he spake as openly and positively about the *Marriages*, both of *Don Carlos* and his *Brother*. One of his *Conversations* was very *Remarkable*, and full of such *Circumstances* as will not let Us doubt of the *Truth* of the Subject of it. "The *King's Ministers* in *Spain* and the whole *Spanish Nation*, (*says He*) "are bitter against me; but I laugh at all that: "The *Queen* will protect me. I have done *her* such "Services, that *she* can't abandon me: For thus the "Matter stands; The *Proposals* of the *Imperial Court* "were of a *Marriage* with the *Prince* of *Asturias*, and "my first *Instructions* from *Spain* were for the *Prince* "of *Asturias*; but it was I, who got that *Destination* "changed. I wrote to the *Queen* to engage the "Prince of *Asturias*, without *Delay*, to a *Daughter* "of *Portugal*, that he might not stand in the *Way* of "Don *Carlos*: And it was I that found the *Way* of "turning all this *Affair* to the *Advantage* of *her* "two *Sons*. And do you think, I have much to "Fear, after such *Services*?"

2. This agrees exactly with the *Language* of the *Court* of *Madrid*; Where, after the *Treaty* of *Peace* was known to be Sign'd at *Vienna*, this *Alliance* with
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the *Emperor* was freely spoke of, as the *Queen's* own *Transaction* entirely, enter'd into and conducted by herself; and the *Marriage* of *Don Carlos* spoke of, at first, without Reserve or Appearance of Secrecy, as a Matter agreed upon. Nor did any one Person, who frequented the Court of *Spain*, make the least Doubt of it.

3. This will help us to Account for other Parts of the *Conduct* of *Spain*: which, without this, will be wholly unaccountable, and out of the Road of all Policy. For instance, Suppose only these *Marriages*, or That alone of *Don Carlos* with the eldest *Arch Dutchess*; and this will shew us, Why that Court could be brought to discard the *Neutral Garrisons*, and all other *Securities* furnish'd by the *Quadruple Alliance* for the *Establishing* her Son, that same *Don Carlos*, in *Italy*; and to trust to the *Emperor's* naked Word in so great a Point: viz. Because by this *Marriage* it would come about, that the *Emperor*, by securing those *Dominions* in *Italy* for *Don Carlos*, would secure them, at the same Time, for the *Issue* of his own *Daughter*; and so must of Necessity, for the Sake of his own Interest, and the aggrandizing his own Family, be sincere and zealous in this Affair. On the other Side, the same Supposition of this *Marriage* gives a reasonable Solution, Why the Court of *Spain* has consented to, what the *Spanish Ministers* at the *Congress* would not hear of, the *Guaranty* of the *Succession* in *Germany*, as lately establish'd in the House of *Austria*: viz. Because it comes about by this *Marriage*, that being *Guarantee* to the *Emperor's* *Succession* in his *Austrian Dominions*, is no more than being *Guarantee* for the *Queen's* own Son *Don Carlos*, the future Husband of the eldest *Arch-Dutchess*; and that *Self-Interest* must make *Spain*, under its

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present Administration, sincere in this *Guaranty*. And upon any other Bottom, we may safely defy the World to give a Solution of *these*, and *several* other Appearances, in this New Alliance.

I need not go further, and appeal to any Words that may have been dropp'd in Confidence, at the Court of *Vienna* itself, upon the Subject of these Marriages; and that, with a particular Pleasure and Satisfaction express'd in them: Since we have so much, and so strong, Evidence of the Reality of it, from the Mouth of *Ripperda*, who made the Treaty; and from the Language of the Court of *Spain* itself; as well as from the utter Inconsistency and Unaccountableness of the Proceedings of that Court without this Supposition.

I acknowledge indeed, That at *Vienna*, when it began to appear, that what had been said upon this Head, had alarm'd *Europe*; and when, in particular, the great Aim was to keep the *Dutch* from acceding to the Treaty of *Hanover*; which might be hasten'd by so terrible an Appearance: Then, the whole Affair of these Marriages was utterly disown'd; nay, in Order to deny these Marriages, it was absolutely denied that there was any such Thing in Being as a *secret Treaty* between the *Emperor* and *Spain*. I am not afraid of relating *this*, after all the Proofs before given of the Reality of a *secret Treaty*, and of this *Article* in it; nor at all unwilling that it should work as much as it can, and have all the Weight it ought to have. For I am confident, that, as this Conduct convinced no one Person at *Vienna*; and made not the least Impression upon the *Dutch Minister*, or his *Masters*; so it will make no Impression upon Any who have read what I have before laid down, unless it be this, That they who can act an unjustifiable Part, can,

can, without Scruple, and with the same Ease, bring themselves to a peremptory and absolute Denial of it, 'till the proper Time comes for their open Avowal of it.

But, as this *Article* of these *Marriages* must remain undoubted; we cannot help spending a few Thoughts upon the *Consequences* of them, or of the First of *them* only. There is but *one* Life, that of the *Prince of Asturias*, between *Don Carlos* and the Crown of *Spain*, after the Death of the present *King*. There is only the same Life between *Don Carlos* and the Crown of *France*; should the present *King* there dye without *Issue Male*; and the late *Renunciations* not take Place: both which Events may happen.

And as to the vast Hereditary Dominions of the House of *Austria*, *Don Carlos* will come to them by Right of his Wife, And as Experience has shewn us, for many Ages, that whoever is Master of these Dominions, and the Power that attends them, has been and must be Emperor, notwithstanding its being an Elective Crown: *Don Carlos*, by marrying the *eldest Arch Dutches*s, cannot fail of being Emperor. So that *Don Carlos* may possibly be at once, Emperor King of *France*, and King of *Spain*: and have the vast Strength and Riches of all these Powers united and center'd in him.

I have thus sufficiently shewn the many and complicated *Evils* of this *New Alliance* between the Emperor and *Spain*; and the just *Apprehensions*, and well-grounded *Fears*, which the Court of *Great Britain* could not but entertain, from all Appearances and all Advices, about the Nature and Tendency of it, with regard to the present *Establishment* of the Crown of *Great Britain*; to our Possessions; our Commerce; our Religion; our Liberties,

and those of all *Europe*; and, in a Word, to every *Thing* that ought to be Dear to Us. And now, Let any Persons amongst us, who know how to prize these *inestimable Goods*, which alone make *Life* it self valuable, survey this *New Alliance* in every Part of it; and judge, “ Whether ever hitherto
 “ any one *Scheme* has appear’d in *Europe*, of a De-
 “ struction so universal, and of a Ruin so extend-
 “ ed, as *This* (taking the whole together) appears
 “ plainly to be”.

It is Time now for us to enquire, What has been the Conduct of the Court of *Great Britain*, upon the View of all these Evils.

1. The first Step they took was to renew, by a Treaty, the Defensive Engagements subsisting between *Great Britain*, *France* and *Prussia*. But this Treaty was not set on Foot till some Months after the *New Alliance* between the *Emperor* and *Spain*; and after the best Intelligences, and most mature Consideration of the Tendency of that Alliance. And as this Treaty, made at *Hanover*, has long been publick in the World, I need not observe that it is a Treaty entirely Defensive between *Britain*, *France* and *Prussia*, for the mutual Support of each other against Injuries; and not at all for the invading or injuring any Nation under Heaven.

2 Particular Regard was shewn to the *States General*, in the framing of the Treaty of *Hanover*; to which they have since acceded. The next Care was to invite the Crown of *Sweden* into this Alliance; that Kingdom having so often and so successfully appeared in the Defence of the Protestant Religion, and of the Liberties of *Europe*. And the Landgrave of *Hesse-Cassel*, whose Family has done such signal Service to the Protestant Cause, readily offer’d a good Body of Troops in Support of this Alliance.

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These are the Steps which the Court of *Great Britain* thought fit to take as soon as possible, after the Danger we were in, appeared evident beyond all Contradiction.

3. As the Parliament of *Great Britain* found their Country immediately threatn'd in its greatest Concerns, from these Treaties of *Vienna*, Both Houses gave his Majesty all Assurance of Support in whatever He should think fit to do in the present critical Conjunction. And accordingly it was necessary now to consider in Earnest what was most proper to be done. The Court of *Great Britain* had evident Proof that nothing could influence the Two *New Allies* to Terms of Reason, but to shew a *vigorous Spirit* against every pernicious or suspicious Part of such an Alliance. And as all Appearances, in all Parts, convinced them, That nothing could so effectually guard against approaching Evils, as the dispatching sufficient *Squadrons* of *Ships* to several Places; and as they were sensible that our Fleet, now the best in the World, could never be of any Account, either towards our *Glory* or our *Safety*, but upon such an Occasion; They did, with all possible Diligence, fit out *Three Squadrons* of *Men of War*; One for the *West Indies*; One for the Coasts of *Spain*; and One for the *Baltick*.

It will now be ask'd, as it has been indeed already, What beneficial *Effect* has this Method had? What Good have we gain'd, or what Evil have we prevented, by these Grand Appearances of our Fleets abroad? And, if an Answer may be reasonably expected by Those who ask these and the like *Questions*, so is it also a just Expectation, That they should be as ready to receive a reasonable Answer to them, as they are to ask them.

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As to the Treaty of *Hanover*, I will suppose, no *Apology* can be expected for *That*, after such a surprising and formidable Conjunction of the *Two Powers* of the *Emperor* and *Spain*; the Design, and the *Articles* of which Conjunction appear'd every Day more and more terrible to their *Neighbours*. The Contracting Parties in the *Hanover Treaty* must have been taxed with *Infatuation* and *Insensibility*, beyond the common Pitch of *Those Evils*, if They had not enter'd into a strict and hearty Concert for their own *Self-defence*, in such Circumstances of present Invasion of the *Trade* of some of them; and of Forebodings of future Evil to them All.

But as the Question here at Home, chiefly, if not solely, refers to our Naval *Armaments* from *England*, What have they produced, or, for what Reasons were They sent? The Answer is very plain. As to the Squadron sent to the *West Indies*, I believe there is no one who has an Estate in those Parts, or is concerned in any Trade thither, who did not think it highly necessary to have a strong Squadron in those Seas, for securing our Commerce; which must otherwise have been inevitably ruined, by the Depredations and Violences committed by the *Spaniards* for several Years past without Redress. And if the sending of the said Squadron has prevented the Return of the *Galleons*, no Man who is in the least conversant in the *Affairs* of *Europe*, can make any Doubt but that this Incident has been the only Thing that has hitherto prevented a War in *Europe*, by depriving the Courts of *Vienna* and *Madrid* of the Means of putting in Execution the dangerous Schemes they had projected.

The Squadron sent to the Coasts of *Spain*, was sent to prevent any Attempt from that Country, to disturb Us at Home: The Court of *Great Britain* being assured, beyond all Doubt, as I have before particu-

particularly related, that an *Offensive Treaty* was concluded at *Vienna*; and that an Attempt was design'd from *Spain*, and Preparations making for it, at that Time, in Favour of the *Pretender*.

And the Squadron sent to the *Baltick*, was sent to prevent very great Evils in those Parts; there being no room to doubt, that the *Czarina's* real View was to go with a Fleet directly to *Stockholm*, and under a Pretence of demanding the Use of the Ports, and the Assistance of *Sweden*, for the Recovery of *Sleswick* to the Duke of *Holstein*, actually to dethrone the present King of *Sweden*, and make that Nation absolutely dependent on *Muscovy*. It was therefore judg'd of the utmost Importance to prevent this, by sending a strong Squadron into the *Baltick*, not only as it was the preserving a Friendly Power, and a Power necessary to the Balance of the North; but particularly, because *Sweden* could not but be consider'd in the Nature of a Frontier and Barrier to *Britain* it self, to such a Degree, that if that Kingdom were once either made Subject to *Russia*, or Dependent upon it, *Britain* it self must be in Apprehension of Attempts from the *Russian Ravagers*, coming with their Fleet, from *Gottenburgh* to our Northern Coasts; an Evil not to be guarded against, after the Subjection of *Sweden*, but by the Expence either of a constant Fleet upon those Coasts, or an armed Force in those Parts of our Country, which lie most open to such Attempts.

The Designs and Views in sending out these Squadrons, being so unexceptionably Good; supposing, That through the Dispositions of Providence, and the Opposition of Winds and Weather, Success had not attended upon any One of these Squadrons; nay, That Great and Extraordinary Misfortunes had followed them All; yet, They who are not so weak as
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to argue from *Success* alone ; They who know the Uncertainty of *Seas*, and *Winds*, and *Weather*, and have too much Understanding to think the *Event* only to be the true-*Criterion* of judging about the *Wisdom* of any Project ; all Persons, I mean, of good Sense, should, methinks, have been ready, even in such a Case, to have applauded what was done upon so good Grounds, and with Views, so much for the Honour and Safety of their Country. But, *God* be thank'd, this is not the Case. Every one of the Armaments has had *Success* equal to the Goodness of the Errand they were all sent upon ; and, even beyond Expectation. For, as to the Squadron in the *West-Indies*, it has not only protected the Trade of His Majesty's Subjects in those Parts, from the Depredations of the *Spaniards* ; but also, the *Galleons*, with their Stores of Money, the *Strength* of the *New Alliance* ; and the *Life* of all the *Projects* concerted in it, are kept back ; and those *Attempts* disappointed, which would have been made, and perhaps succeeded, had such *Riches* come to their Aid. The Execution of the Schemes laid in *Spain*, for an Invasion of *Great-Britain*, in Favour of the *Pretender*, was, at that Time, prevented, by the Appearance of a *British* Fleet upon the *Spanish* Coasts ; and all the Evils and Disorders, as well as Expence, avoided, which an Attack of that Sort must have occasion'd, even supposing it repulsed from hence ; and the utter Ruin and Destruction, that must have ensued, had it succeeded. And by the Squadron in the *Baltick*, the *Czarina's* whole Force of Ships and Gallies was kept in, within the Bounds of Safety to *themselves* and their *Neighbours* ; Her destructive Designs against *Sweden*, with all their ill Consequences to *Britain*, and to other Countries of *Europe*, prevented from

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Execution in every Instance: And, after all the boasted Strength of the *Ships* and *Seamen* in the Service of that *Crown*, *Russia* it self, and all *Europe* convinc'd, That *twenty British Men of War* can, upon any Occasion, make them disappear as if they were not, and shelter themselves in their own Ports, as if they had no Views but those of Quiet and Security.

But here is the great Advantage to *Those* who make such *Enquiries* as these we have been now considering, without a Disposition to be satisfy'd: That *Evils* prevented, go for no *Evils*; and because they were not visibly perceiv'd by our Eyes, nor sensibly felt by our Nerves, before we find them at a greater Distance from us, therefore, They who are in the Disposition of *Satyr* (so much easier than *Praise*) will probably think themselves at *Liberty* to deny this *Freedom* from such *Evils*, to be at all the Effect of the Measures taken; and to persist in it, That no such *Evils* would have come, or could have been justly fear'd, if these Methods had not been taken. And in this Manner, I own, They may talk for ever against all possible Light; if the whole *Scene* which I have, in the former Part of these Papers, laid before them, be not of Force enough to work another Perswasion in them. Yet, *one* Thing, I will affirm, "That we, and other Nations are, at present, actually free from the *Evils* and *Attempts* I have mention'd, since these *vigorous Measures* have shew'd themselves in the View of *Europe*; and that They themselves cannot say, it was *certain* (as others will not say, it was in the least *probable*) that We should have been free from those *Evils*, and those *Attempts*, had not these *Measures* been taken."

Thus, therefore, stands the Affair of these *three Squadrons*. They were sent upon Designs of the last Consequence, and exceedingly Honourable, to

Great-Britain: And they have had the Success of fully answering the Ends proposed.

It was not, we see, to assert the *Sovereignty* of the *Seas*, merely by shewing themselves in several Parts of the World in a *Form* superior to that of other Nations, that these *Armaments* were fitted out. The asserting our *Sovereignty* of the *Seas*, as a Point of mere *Speculation*, at a great Expence, and without any other View, may, perhaps, be a Subject fit for Men of Wit to be pleasant with, and to entertain themselves and their Friends upon. But to assert the *Sovereignty* of the *Seas*, as a *Point of Action*, upon a just Occasion: --- To shew this *Sovereignty* in the Sight of those Nations, who are making their own Strength at *Sea* the Instrument of Ruin to their Neighbours: --- To shew it, in Opposition to those Nations who are contriving to convey Mischief to ourselves, and Assistance to our Enemies, by the Sea itself: --- If *this* be not the proper Business, and the peculiar Glory of *Britain*, as the greatest *Maritime Power* now in *Europe*, then our *Navy* is itself a *Ridicule* upon ourselves; an Ostentation only, kept up at a vast Expence; and a Piece of *Vanity*, unworthy of a *Grave* and *Wise* Nation. But no more upon this Part of the Subject.

Another *Question* will be as'd, What has been, and must be, our *Expence* upon this Occasion: And it will be added, Are we alone to bear such Burthens, without a Proportion of *Expence* from those who are our *Allies*; whilst *Those* whom we are opposing, seem to be at little, or none at all? To the first Branch of this *Question*, *What is our Expence?* It is certainly enough to answer in General, Let it be what it will; if it be necessary for our own Security, and that of *Europe*; if it be incurred for the preventing the greatest *Evils*, and as the only *Means* of procuring a better State of Things: It may justly be said, to be not at all comparable to the Necessity
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for it ; not to be put in the *Balance* against the *Mischiefs* which might have arisen from the Want of it ; and very much beneath the *Good* which has and will come from it. The whole Point to every true *Briton* is, Whether it was necessary, fitting, and reasonable : --- They that think it *certainly* so, and They that think it *probably* so, must be pleased with it. They that think it a mere Piece of *Gaiety* in Those who preside, or an hasty Blunder in the Dark, will have other Resentments about it : But they must first *think* them mere *Mad-men*, or mere *Idiots*, before they can come to this. In the mean Time, till something of this Sort appears, we cannot but think, That, if the attempting to guard ourselves and our Neighbours from very great and comprehensive *Evils*, be laudable ; and if the preventing the Beginnings of those *Evils* can make an *Expence* necessary, fitting, and reasonable ; then the *Expence* upon the present Occasion is certainly so.

But as this in general is Satisfaction enough, of whatever Sort or Degree the *Expence* is ; provided it be a *lesser Evil* than what it has hitherto kept off : So it will not be disagreeable to remark, That the *Expence* upon these *Naval Armaments* is of such a Nature, and accompanied with such *Circumstances*, as to make it much the more tolerable in the Eyes of every *Briton*. The *Expence* is chiefly an *Expence* amongst ourselves, and such as only circulates Money from one Hand to another. The Victualling so many Ships is the Advantage of our own *Farmers* and *Graziers*. The Rigging out and equipping them, gives Money to our own Builders and Workmen. The putting them into Motion when they are so repair'd, is known to be of Service to the Ships themselves ; which otherwise lie still, and often receive such Damage, as at the End it costs more to rectify. The Employing so many Seamen is still employ-

ing *our own* Subjects, and giving our Money to our own Country-men: Besides the great future Benefit arising from this Necessity itself; as they are kept in Action by it, and inured to the Service of their *Country*, and the more fit to defend it upon all Occasions to come. So that the *Expence* of our Naval Defence, which is the true and natural Defence of *Britain*; tho' it, indeed, must be a *Burthen* to those who pay towards it, as all *Payments* are: Yet it is a Burthen with this Advantage to the *Publick*, that it sends not *our Money* abroad; it loses it not to the *Nation*; it removes it indeed out of *one* Pocket into *another*, but it is still *our Money*, and remains among *ourselves*. The *Community* and *Body* of *Subjects* taken together are not the *Poorer* for it, tho' the *Persons* paying it to others are so: And if it be for their own *necessary Defence*, and for the Safety of all the Rest of their Possessions, All honest Men among them will be glad, They are so.

But then our *Expence*, tho' great, is not alone. The Dispositions made by *France*, ever since the Signing the Treaty of *Hanover*, have more than kept pace with us, in the Largeness of the *Expence*. The first Step taken by the most *Christian King* was, to augment his regular Troops with *Twenty five Thousand Men*; and this in such a Manner, that they were presently ready for Action upon any Occasion. At the same Time he order'd a Levy of the *Militia*, to the Number of *Sixty Thousand Men*; and appointed these to be commanded by the *Ancient Officers* reform'd of his old Troops; not to mention *Twelve Thousand Invalids*, put into good Order, and double Officer'd, for the Defence of such of his *Cittadels* and *Forts* as they are proper for. These, and other Dispositions, which have been made to put *France* into a Condition to support a War, if it should be necessary, amounted, for this last Year, by a certain Calculation, to Fifteen Hundred and Sixty

Sixty Thousand Pounds *Sterling* ; and if the *Militia* should be obliged to march out of their Provinces to the Frontiers, it will amount to a far greater Sum. And by this Method it comes to pass, that these Sixty Thousand *Militia* , and Twelve Thousand *Invalids* , remaining in *Garrisons* and fortified Places, as the Service shall require ; that *King* can send into the Field, without Inconvenience, 165000 Men of his *Regular Troops* . Such has been for some Time the Disposition there, in Order to shew the *New Allies* , that *France* is not only in earnest, but in a well disposed Condition of disputing any *Attempts* against *itself* or its *Allies* .

The *united Provinces* indeed, came but lately into the *Alliance* , from the Frame of their *Constitution* , naturally begetting *Delays* , and prolonging their *Debates* ; and not from any Want of the Sense of their Dangers, and the Necessity of their acceding to the *Treaty of Hanover* . For from the Time of their *Accession* to that *Treaty* , they have shewn a Warmth and Vigour worthy of the Occasion. They have agreed unanimously upon such *Augmentations* of their Land Forces, as by next Spring will make them above 50000 effective Men : And the necessary Measures are taking for their having a Fleet at Sea of Twenty Men of War. Besides which *Expence* , relating to these *Augmentations* , They have been at a very great Charge in providing their *Magazines* , and putting their *Barrier* and *Frontier* Places into a good Posture of *Defence* . But whoever reads the late *Resolutions* and *Representations* of the *States General* ; and sees with how deep a Concern, and in how pathetical a Manner, they speak of the *Calamities* now threatening themselves, and the rest of *Europe* ; declaring their Ruin must ly at their own Door, if all the *Provinces* do not, in a Case of such Necessity, consent to act the Part of Men in a vigorous Defence of themselves, and readily con-

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cur in " *What, in the Opinion of their High Mightinesses, is indispensably necessary to the common Safety and Preservation; and without which the Well-being, Liberty, and Religion of the whole Republick, will be put to the Venture.*" Whoever reads this, and much more said and inculcated by them with a particular Vehemence, will not think, that they are not determin'd to defend themselves by all necessary Measures against the Dangers now hanging over their Heads.

At the same Time, those *Powers*, which have raised this *Alarm*, and occasioned this *defensive Expence* to their *Neighbours*, cannot stir one Step in their own *offensive Designs*, without a very considerable one to themselves. His *Imperial Majesty*, besides the many Promises of another Sort, which he has bestowed around him, has entered into *real Obligations* which cannot be performed but at a very great Expence. To the *Elector of Cologne* he has engaged to pay 600,000 *German Florins* a Year, for two Years; to the *Elector of Bavaria*, the same; to the *Elector Palatin* and of *Treves*, the same; and to the *Duke of Wolfenbuttle* 200,000 *Florins*; besides what is stipulated to others. Add to these his own great *Expences*, in recruiting and in refitting his whole Army, and preparing every thing of all Sorts, necessary for *Action*: An *Expence* in the whole so great! that nothing but the vast Advantages it is to receive from his new Alliance, and the Expectation of *Remittances* from *Spain*, could have induced him to think of it. And what then must the Expence of *Spain* be; which has not only its own Army to put in Order and augment; not only its own Towns and Coasts to guard; but the Emperor's Demands to answer? And what a *State* of things must the Necessities of *Spain* itself, together with the Demands of the *Emperor*, bring that *King* and his *Country* into; even if his *Flota* with its usual *Cargo* of
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Money should come Home safe: When it is well known, that, *before* these new *Expences* (the Effect of the *New Alliance*) all the *Civil* and *Military* Officers belonging to that Crown, and their whole Army, were in great *Arrears*; and all the *Royal Revenues* anticipated for a Year and a Half; and that the *whole Nation* was in a State of very great Poverty and Distress? And if such immense *Expences* can be run into with *Zeal*, for the Injury and Oppression of other Countries: Surely an Expence, much smaller in itself; and directed solely to the Defence and Preservation of *our selves* in the *Rights* and *Properties* we are justly in Possession of, cannot be thought unworthy of the *British Nation*; nor unjustifiable in those who have already begun it, only because they thought it absolutely *necessary*; but still other *Questions* arise upon this Subject.

It may be asked, Could not the Court of Great Britain all this while have tryed other *Methods*, than alarming Europe with *Fleets*? The Methods of a friendly Congress, or Proposals of a more peaceable and amicable Nature? Was there no Way of proceeding, but demanding of the *Emperor*, the sole Propriety of *Trade*; and engrossing it to Britain and *Holland*; as if other Nations had no Right to the *World*, beside our selves? In which Way of talking there is something very right, and something very wrong. For certainly it must be granted, That we ought to prepare ourselves with Vigour to oppose *Injury*; as well as to be ready to propose, or receive any reasonable Methods of Accommodation. To do the *first*, without a Disposition shewn to the *latter*, I acknowledge, would have been unjustifiable. To do the *latter* without the *first*, had been Weakness and Folly; and could have proceeded from *nothing*, but a Total Ignorance of the plainest *Rules* of political Conduct, which have long ago established it as a certain *Maxim*, That the best Way to *Peace*, upon such Occa-

Occasions, is with the *Sword* prepared for the Day of Necessity; and that those *Powers*, who can suffer themselves to invade or demand the *Rights* of others, will laugh at all Accommodations offered, when they see them unaccompanied with such *Appearances*, as shew the *Resolution* of Those others to defend their *Rights* by *Force*, if Reason cannot prevail.

I answer therefore, to these and the like *Questions*.

1. It never could have been justified, in the Court of *Great Britain*, to have made *Proposals* of Accommodation, without the most vigorous Measures taken, which alone could make them effectual. 2. In some of the *Pretences* and *Demands* of this new *Alliance*, no Equivalent, no Accommodation, could be proposed. In the Case of the Demand of *Gibraltar*, whilst the *Nation* seems universally to concur, that no Sum of Money, nor any other Place of Strength abroad, can be any *Equivalent* to it: what could be proposed, but a *Resolution* to defend the *Nation* in its just *Possession* of it; especially, since the whole present Conduct of *Spain* may assure us, by a fresh Evidence, that it is of the utmost Importance; and that, if that Place were once gone out of our Hands, we should have still less Hope of seeing *Treaties* observ'd, or of hindering ourselves from being more and more injured, on that side, in our *Commerce*? 3. In the other great Case, that of the *Emperor's* new Establishment at *Offend*, the Court of *Great Britain* never went upon such an arbitrary Maxim as, That other *Nations* ought not to be permitted to begin and extend their *Commerce* wherever they rightfully could, as well as our selves; or that we had any Right to oppose such Attempts: But upon these undoubted Maxims of Truth and Right, — That *Treaties* are to be observed; — That, when any Country is excluded by *Treaties* from any particular Branch of *Commerce*, it is not to be authorized and supported in carrying on the said Branches of *Commerce*, in Violation of the said *Treaties*;

ties; and — That *those Powers*, which have, by repeated *Engagements*, obliged themselves to defend and support the *British* and *Dutch Trade*, are justly to be opposed, when they themselves come to be the *Invaders* and *Destroyers* of it. Agreeably to all this, 4. As the Court of Great Britain has taken such vigorous Measures, as shew the Resolution of Self-defence; so has it never been wanting either to propose, or to receive any reasonable Method for the Accommodation of this Matter, to the *Emperor's* Satisfaction; if he could be satisfied with any thing, but a Trade in open Contradiction to all Treaties:

In particular, it was sufficiently intimated to the Court of *Vienna*, that the *British* Court pretended to nothing in this *Affair*, but to defend the Right of Trade belonging to Britain by Treaties; far from assuming to Themselves any Right of controlling the *Emperor* or his Subjects, in any Attempts, not contrary to those Treaties: That therefore, if the *Emperor* would remove this Company, and the Seat of Trade now at *Ostend*, to *Trieste*, or any other Place in his Dominions, which did not heretofore belong to the *Spanish* Monarchy, Britain was ready quietly to acquiesce. And the same was offer'd to the Court of *Madrid*, in the Form of a Proposal, when his *Catholic Majesty* had just begun to espouse the *Emperor's* Interest in this *Affair* of *Ostend*.

But, tho' the Court of *Spain* not only acknowledged the Reasonableness of the Proposal, but made great Professions of Hope that it would be accepted, yet, at the same Time it was declared, That *Spain* was under Engagements to stand by the *Emperor*, even supposing his unreasonable Refusal of it. And at *Vienna*, the Intimation made no Impression at all. The Resolution there, by this appearing plainly to be, The Support of the *Ostend* Company, and Trade from the *Netherlands*, against all *Stipulations*.

But however this ended at *Vienna* and *Madrid*;

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It must have this Effect at *London*, to convince all Persons, that, as *no one*, either real or pretended, *Provocation* from *Britain*, gave the first *Occasion* for this *new Alliance*; (one End of which was the Establishment of the Emperor's new and unwarrantable Designs in *Trade*;) So, the *Court of Great Britain*, in the midst of all Preparations for the *Defence* of this Nation's Rights, has not neglected to try *other Methods* of a *peaceable* and *amicable* Nature; but shewn a readiness to do any thing, even for present Peace, except to give up the *Advantages*, *Rights* and *Privileges* of *Britain*, of more Importance than present Peace: and these *Advantages* founded upon *Treaties*; which therefore, They who preside are obliged to guard and defend, as a sacred *Depositum*, not only out of Love to their *Country*, common to Them with all others, but out of *peculiar Duty* and *Obligation*; as they are intrusted with this *Guardianship* and *Defence*, by the *Publick*; and as an Account of this Trust may justly be demanded of them.

If then, nothing reasonable, in the Way of *Accommodation*, has been wanting on their Part; They will not easily be blamed, (it is to be hoped rather, they will be highly commended) for This, that They have not permitted themselves to be misled by any smooth Words without Meaning; or to be hindred from taking all necessary Precautions, by any *Amusements* of *Congresses*, or *Embassies*, or *Negotiations*, only thrown in their Way to gain *Time* to others, and to lose it to themselves: Since it is evident, that *irreparable* and *irretrievable* Evils might have come from the not taking these necessary and timely Precautions. And were it so, that They had spent their whole Time in sending and receiving fruitless Messages backwards and forwards, in such a critical Conjunction; we may venture to say, we know the Persons who would have

have been the *first* to charge, (and very deservedly too) the Ruin of this *Nation* upon them; and to have demanded Justice against them for such a Conduct, in such a Time of Danger to their Country.

And indeed, supposing this to have been the Case; supposing the Court of *Great Britain*, in such a Situation; with such repeated Advices from all Parts; with such Demonstrations of Danger from Abroad, as put out of all Doubt the true Nature and Designs of so formidable an *Alliance* as that of the *Emperor* and *Spain*: I say, supposing this Court, surrounded with all these Evidences, to have entred into *no* Measures of Defence with any neighbouring *States* and *Princes*; to have taken *no* Steps towards preventing the Mischief threatned; to have sent out *no Naval Armaments*, either to preserve any *friendly* Powers, or to quash any Attempts of *others*; Who would not rise up, and demand an Account of such a Conduct from Those who alone are to answer for it? Who would not join in saying, “Is this the *Usage* fit to be given to a *brave* and considering People? Is this the watchfulness of *Those*, whose Duty it is to attend to every distant View of Danger? Or, do They think so meanly of *us* and the *whole Nation*, that we can see nothing but what we *feel*; and that we have a Sense of *no Evil*, but what is *present*: Or, that we are so made, that a *little Expence* would affright us from preserving our *all*; or, reduced to so *low* a Condition of Poverty, that we can’t purchase or furnish out even *Self-Defence* to our selves? Were not other *Princes* and *States* threatned by the same Danger; and ready to unite with us! Must our *Fleet*, the Glory (as it is call’d) of this Land, lie still and decay, rather than be made our Bulwark? Our *Fleet*, falsly call’d our *Glory*, but *indeed* our shame, whilst it is laid aside as useless, at a Time when
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“ That alone might make us look too formidable in
 “ *Europe*, to be insulted or affronted? Or, does even
 “ this *Expence* which circulates chiefly amongst
 “ our selves, appear too formidable to a *Nation*
 “ which those around it *envy*, as the *Centre* of *Rich-*
 “ *es* and *Plenty*? But why do we speak of *Expence*?
 “ It is this Method of *Indolence* and *Inactivity* upon
 “ such an Occasion, which must bring after it an
 “ *Expence* much greater in itself; and much more
 “ hazardous in its Effect; as Time shall add *Strength*
 “ to the *Danger* threatn’d? an *Expence*, which must
 “ increase our Debt, and at the same Time *Diminish*
 “ the Hope of paying it. What Account can we
 “ give of such a *Treatment* of this Nation? As we
 “ can find *none* in all the known Measures of *Politi-*
 “ *cal Prudence*; we must search for it somewhere
 “ else.— There must be *secret Reasons* for such a
 “ Conduct; and perhaps *these* may lie in the *Riches*
 “ of *Spain*, suffered to come safely Home, to
 “ strengthen and consolidate the most dangerous
 “ *Conjunction* that ever yet appeared in *Europe*.”—
 This, and much more, might justly be urged, upon
 the Supposition of a *negligent* and *unactive* Conduct
 in this *Crisis* of *Danger*. And what Reply to make
 to it, I profess I think it utterly impossible to tell.

But this is not the Case. The Court of *Great*
Britain has acted quite another Part; and enter’d
 into that Method of *vigorous Self-Defence*, by which
 alone, in all human Wisdom, there can be the least
 Hope of preventing or repulsing any dangerous At-
 tempts against all our highest Concerns; and a *Me-*
thod, to which No other Principle could possibly
 have directed Those who have chosen it, but *That*
 of an *honest Regard* to the *Possessions*, the *Trade*, the
Rights, the *Well-being*, and the *Being* itself, of this
 now happy and envied Nation.

F I N I S.



